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THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE AT THE FEDERAL
LEVEL AND IN MARYLAND: ITS UNCERTAIN FUTURE
AFTER GEORGIA v. McCOLLUM

I.

INTRODUCTION

One of the primary purposes of the Supreme Court is to interpret
the Constitution and recognize the rights guaranteed therein. The
establishment of personal liberties has usually depended on the com. position of the Court and the current political sentiment. One aspect
that has not varied, however, is the Court's reluctance to provide
detailed, or at times even general, guidelines for the administration
of these newly founded rights. The Court has viewed the lower court
system as the proper venue for such detailed tasks. One need only
examine the problematic impact of the phrase "with all deliberate
speed"l to understand that in fashioning rights the Court tends to
bypass the dramatic repercussions such guarantees may have on the
administration of justice. 2 In its ministrations with the peremptory
challenge, the Court has again neglected to examine the overall impact
likely to be engendered.
The peremptory challenge has been around since the very early
days of English common law. 3 It was adopted by the American
1. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 u.s. 294, 301 (1955).
2. The application of Brown has generated a considerable number of commentaries. For an overview of the problems encountered, see generally Philip T.K.
Daniel, A Comprehensive Analysis oj Educational Choice: Can the Polemic oj
Legal Problems be Overcome?, 43 DEPAUL L. REv. I, 39-47 (1993); James B.
Egle, Comment, Constitutional Implications oj School Choice, 1992 WIS. L.
REV. 459, 487-95; Robert B. McKay, "With All Deliberate Speed": A Study
oj School Desegregation, 31 N.Y.U. L. REV. 991 (1956); Mark Tushnet, What
Really Happened in Brown v. Board oj Education, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1867,
1928-29 (1991).
3. The earliest usage of the peremptory challenge gave the Crown an unlimited
ability to select a jury of its choice. See generally JON M. VAN DYKE, JURY
SELECTION PROCEDURES: OUR UNCERTAIN COMMITMENT TO REPRESENTATIVE
PANELS 147 (1971). This power was taken away in 1305 when Parliament passed
a statute eliminating the Crown's ability to issue a peremptory challenge,
creating in its place challenges for "Cause shown." 33 Edw. I, Stat. 4 (1305).
This limitation did not last long, as judges construed the statute to allow the
Crown the power to direct any juror to "stand aside." See, e.g., Mansell v.
Regina, 120 Eng. Rep. 20, 27 (1857) ("no intention of taking away all power
of peremptory challenge from the Crown, while that power ... was left to
the prisoner"); Regina v. Frost, 173 Eng. Rep. 711, 776 (1839) ("not a correct
inference from the words of the statute that the Crown is deprived of its right
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system, being recognized by Congress as early as 1780 as a device to
be used by defendants in trials of treason and other capital crimes.4
Until the mid-1960s, little was done to the peremptory challenge,
except occasional measures that regulated the number of challenges
either side could issue.5' In 1965, however, there began a line of cases
that radically affected the peremptory challenge and may ultimately
lead to its abandonment.
In Swain v. Alabama,6 the United States Supreme Court began
this progression by recognizing that a criminal defendant's right to
equal protection was violated when potential jurors were excluded
from a jury on the basis of race.' In 1986, the Court's decision in
Batson v. Kentucky redefined the burden of proof for such a claim,
making it possible for a criminal defendant to prevail against a
prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to strike jurors on the
basis of race. 9 The cases following Batson shifted the equal protection
focus, however, from the defendant to the affected juror. With this
shift, the decisions in Powers v. Ohio lO and Edmonson v. Leesville
Concrete Co. II led inextricably to the Court's recent ruling in Georgia
v. McCol/um,12 in which it held that a criminal defendant may not
use peremptory challenges on the basis of race.
It is this change in ·focus that is the basis for this Comment.
The Court has created a broad substantive right in an area where

4.

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

to challenges"); VAN DYKE, supra, at 148.
As applied to defendants, the peremptory challenge was always allowed
for felonies at common law. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 212n.9
(1965); 4 BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES 353 (15th ed. 1809) ("peremptory challenge: a provision full of that tenderness and humanity to prisoners"). However,
its application in civil proceedings at common law was questionable. See
Kabatchnick v. Hanover-Elm Bldg. Corp., 119 N.E.2d 169, 172 (Mass. 1954)
("right to make a peremptory challenge did not exist at common law but is
of statutory origin").
Acts of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 30, 1 Stat. 119. The defendant was entitled to
35 peremptory challenges in trials for treason and 20 peremptory challenges in
other felonies punishable by death. See Swain, 380 U.S. at 214. The state's
use of peremptory challenges was uncertain in the development of early
American law. The general practice, it seems, was to allow the state peremptory
challenges by adopting the common law practice of "standing aside." See VAN
DYKE, supra note 3, at 149. In 1865, Congress statutorily granted the government the power to use peremptory challenges. See Swain, 380 U.S. at 215
(citing 13 Stat. 500 (1865».
See VAN DYKE, supra note 3, at 150.
380 U.S. 202 (1965).
Id. at 223-24.
476 U.S. 79 (1986).
See infra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
499 U.S. 400 (1991).
500 U.S. 614 (1991).
112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992).
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discrimination was traditionally allowed. With every peremptory challenge comes some discriminatory intent. The party using the strike
does so believing that the potential juror will be unfavorable to that
party's cause. The Court has now stated that certain discriminatory
motivations may not be the basis for those strikes.13 According to
the Court, a party issuing a discriminatory strike violates the equal
protection right of the juror .14 This decision presents a variety of
questions. How can a criminal defendant be a state actor? What
specific motivations are prohibited? What particular groups are protected? How will the courts deal with these new developments? Will
their efforts amount to anything?
Part II of this Comment outlines Strauder v. West Virginia lS
and Batson v. Kentucky, 16 the federal cases that developed the equal
protection right for the criminal defendant. Part III discusses Powers
v. Ohio l7 through Georgia v. McCollum,ls the cases concerning the
shift in equal protection guarantees from the defendant to the juror.
Analysis will cover both the protected party and the differing actors
involved in using the peremptory challenge. Part IV reviews the
developments in Maryland case law. Focus will be directed to two
aspects inherent in Maryland law that have limited the application
of the equal protection right. Finally, Part V discusses the realities
involved in the current situation. Specifically, the analysis will center
on three topics: (1) the McCollum Court's labeling of the criminal
defendant as a state actor; (2) which groups have been, or should be
protected; and (3) whether the voir dire system used in Maryland
actually encourages illegal strikes.
II. EQUAL PROTECTION FOR THE DEFENDANT:
STRA UDER AND BATSON
Although not decided in the context of peremptory challenges,
Strauder v. West Virginia l9 began the analysis of discrimination in
jury selection. In 1880, a black criminal defendant challenged a state
law that prohibited blacks from sitting on juries. 20 The United States
Supreme Court ruled that the State denied the black defendant equal
protection when it tried him before a jury from which the State had
13. E.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (barring racial discrimination in

the prosecutor's use of the peremptory challenge).
14, [d. at 84.

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

100
476
499
112
100

U.S. 303 (1880).
U.S. 79 (1986).
U.S. 400 (1991).
S. Ct. 2348 (1992).
U.S. 303 (1880).
20. [d. at 305.
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purposefully excluded members of his race. 21 Although the Court
would not extend its holding to require that the defendant have a
"jury composed in whole or in part of persons of his own race, "22
it did require that the jury venire23 be selected according to nondiscriminatory criteria. 24
In deciding Strauder, the Court indicated its belief that the
composition of the jury would affect the outcome of the case: "It
is well known that prejudices often exist against particular classes in
the community, which sway the judgment of jurors, and which, .
therefore, operate in some cases to deny to persons of those classes
the full enjoyment of that protection which others enjoy. "25 Thus,
the basis of the Court's decision was that the individual most affected
by a jury selected on the basis of racial grounds was the defendant
and not the juror. 26
Peremptory challenges used on the basis of race were the sp.ecific
issue in the 1965 decision of Swain v. AlabamaY In Swain, a black
criminal defendant had been convicted by an all-white jury.28 On
appeal, the defendant cited Strauder for the proposition that the
prosecution had violated his equal protection rights by excluding all
black members of the jury venire through the use of peremptory
challenges. 29 The Court's opinion included an exhaustive historical
study of the peremptory challenge. 3o From this overview, the Court
228

21. Id. at 309-10. The majority could not find any state interest that may have
allowed for such a measure:
[H]ow can it be maintained that compelling a colored man to submit
to a trial for his life by a jury drawn from a panel from which the
State has expressly excluded every man of his race, because of color
alone ... is not a denial to him of equal legal protection?
Id. at 309.
22. Id. at 305.
23. The jury venire is the initial large pool of jurors from which the petit jury is
taken. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1556 (6th ed. 1990).
24. The Court recognized that the State has the power to mandate certain qualifying
factors for jurors: "males ... freeholders ... persons within certain ages ...
or ... persons having educational qualifications." Strauder, 100 U.S. at 310.
However, the Equal Protection Clause was designed specifically to protect
"against discrimination because of race or color." Id.
25. Id. at 309. It was recognized that peremptory challenges could result in "packing
juries" against the defendant. Id.
26. In its discussion, the Court recognized the prejudicial effects the state statute
had on the excluded jurors. See infra note 58. However, the final focus was
on the "denial of the equal protection of the laws to a colored man when he
is put on trial," and judged by a group purposely chosen to discriminate
against him. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 310.
27. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
28. Id. at 205.
29. Id. at 203.
30. Id. at 212-19.
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concluded that the peremptory challenge had always been afforded
wide latitude. 3) According to the Court, its "essential nature ... is
that it is one exercised without a reason stated, without inquiry and
without being subject to the court's control."32 Given this discretion,
it was presumed that the prosecutor was using peremptory challenges
in such a manner as to seat a "fair and impartial jury."33
The Swain Court recognized, however, that in some extreme
instances a defendant's equal protection rights might be violated. 34
In order to establish a violation, the defendant had to show the
"prosecutor's systemic use of peremptory challenges against Negroes
over a period of time."3s The realities of satisfying this burden were
then vividly demonstrated. The Court ruled that the defendant had
not shown the necessary proof even though there was evidence that
no black had served on a jury "within the memory of persons now
living. "36 The Court required proof that the prosecutor alone was
responsible for that result.J7
Criticism of the Swain decision, and its rigorous burden of
proof, came from members of the Court and various commentators. 38
31. [d. at 220.
32. [d.
33. [d. at 222. This presumption allows the Court to dismiss a claim based only
on the government's use of peremptory challenges in that particular case. [d.
34. [d. at 223-24.
35. [d. at 227. "[W]hen the prosecutor in a county, in case after case ... is

responsible for the removal of Negroes who have been selected as qualified
jurors . . . with the result that no Negroes ever serve on petit juries, the
Fourteenth Amendment takes on added significance." [d. at 223.
The Court likened this burden of proof to the one advanced in Yick Wo
v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). In Yick Wo, a local ordinance required that
a license be obtained in order to operate a business. [d. at 357-58. There were
over 200 Chinese applicants, all of whom were denied a license. [d. at 359.
All non-Chinese applicants, with only one exception, received their license. [d.
The Court reasoned that such widespread application must be discriminatory
and illegal. [d. at 373-74.
36. Swain, 380 U.S. at 231 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
37. [d. at 224-28. The Court referred to testimony which revealed that on several
occasions black defendants had preferred an all-white jury. [d. at 225. To
explain the complete lack of blacks on juries in the past, the Court accepted
the prosecutor's statement that his use of a peremptory challenge on a black
juror depended "'upon the circumstances and the conditions and the case and
what I thought justice demanded ... in that particular case.'" [d. at 225.
38. See Thomson v. United States, 469 U.S. 1024, 1026 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
denying cert. to 730 F.2d 82 (8th Cir. 1984) ("With the hindsight that two
decades affords, it is apparent to me that Swain's reasoning was misconceived."); Williams v. Illinois, 466 U.S. 981, 983 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting) denying cert. to 454 N.E.2d 220 (Ill. 1983) ("As the years pass, it
becomes increasingly clear that the problem will not be solved until this Court
intervenes."); Swain, 380 U.S. at 246 (Goldberg, J., dissenting) ("By adding
to the present heavy burden of proof required of defendants in these cases,
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The consensus was that this burden would be impossible for a
defendant to meet, thereby nullifying the defendant's granted right. 39
Defendants battled with this situation until 1986 when the Court
decided Batson v. Kentuckyto and overruled the Swain Court's burden
of proof requirement. 41 Batson involved the trial of a black man for
burglary and receipt of stolen goods. 42 When selecting the jury, the
prosecutor excluded all of the black persons on the jury venire. 43
The defendant charged that this exclusion violated both his Sixth
Amendment right to a jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the
community and his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection.44
The Supreme Court dismissed the Sixth Amendment claim out
of hand,45 but held that the defendant's equal protection rights were

39.

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

the Court creates additional barriers to the elimination of [discrimination in
jury selections]."); People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748, 767 (Cal. 1978) (noting
that Swain affords no protection to the first defendant to suffer discrimination);
VAN DYKE, supra note 3, at 166-67; Frederick L. Brown, et aI., The Peremptory
Challenge as a Manipulative Device in Criminal Trials: Traditional Use or
Abuse, 14 NEW ENG. L. REV. 192, 193 (1978) (arguing that Swain "presents
an unworkable standard of review and fails to remedy the most pervasive
forms of prosecutorial misuse of the challenge' '); Michael N. Chesney & Gerard
T. Gallagher, Note, State Action and the Peremptory Challenge: Evolution oj
the Court's Treatment and Implications jor Georgia v. McCollum, 67 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1049, 1052 (1992) (referring to the "immunity from inquiry"
which prosecutors enjoyed after Swain); Samuel R. Gross & Robert Mauro,
Patterns oj Death: An Analysis oj Racial Disparities in Capital Sentencing and
Homicide Victimization, 37 STAN. L. REV. 27, 119 n.250 (1984) (concluding
that Swain's burden of proof is "virtually impossible").
But see Stephen A. SaItzburg & Mary Ellen Powers, Peremptory Challenges
and the Clash Between Impartiality and Group Representation, 41 MD. L.
REV. 337, 346 (1982) ("while the test is demanding, it is not beyond satisfaction").
See McCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d lIB, 1120-21 (2d Cir. 1984), vacated and
remanded, 478 U.S. 1001 (1986); United States v. Childress, 715 F.2d 1313,
1316 (8th Cir. 1983) (noting that research disclosed only two cases where the
defendant had met the burden of proof established in Swain), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 1063 (1984).
476 U.S. 79 (1986).
Id. at 93.
Id. at 82.
Id. at 83.
[d. at 83-84.
[d. at 84 n.4. The Court addressed the denial of Sixth Amendment protection
a week later in Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986), where the Court
soundly rejected the defendant's argument that the fair-cross-section component
of the Sixth Amendment applied to peremptory challenges:
We have never invoked the fair-cross-section principle to invalidate
the use of either for-cause or peremptory challenges to prospective
jurors, or to require petite juries . . . to reflect the composition of
the community at large. The limited scope of the fair-cross-section
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infringed.46 The Court relied on the Strauder Court's rationale that
"the state denies a black defendant equal protection of the laws
when it puts him on trial before a jury from which members of his
race have been purposely excluded. "47 Much of the Court's language
was based on the assumption that a jury selected by excluding
members of the defendant's race would not perform in an unbiased
manner.48
In rejecting the Swain Court's burden of proof requirement,49
the Court fashioned anew, three-prong test that defendants must
meet to establish a prima facie case against a prosecutor's conduct.
The defendant must first prove that he is a "member of a cognizable
racial group," and that the prosecutor used peremptory challenges
to exclude members of that group.so Second, the defendant "may
rely on the fact . . . that peremptory challenges constitute a jury
selection practice that permits 'those to discriminate who are of a
mind to discriminate. "'SI Finally, the defendant "must show that
these facts and any other relevant circumstances raise an inference
that the prosecutor used that practice to exclude the veniremen from
the petit jury on account of their race.' 'S2 The Court left the lower
courts to determine what level of evidence is necessary to establish

requirement is a direct am! inevitable consequence of the practicable
impossibility of providing each criminal defendant with a truly "rep'resentative" petit jury .... We remain convinced that an extension
of the fair-cross-section requirement to petit juries would be unworkable and unsound . . . .
[d. at 173-74 (citations omitted).
46. Batson, 476 U.S. at 84-88.
47. [d. at 85. The Court reiterated its statement in Strauder that a "defendant has
no right to a 'petit jury composed in whole or in part of persons of his own
race.'" [d. (quoting Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 305 (1880». It
then tempered this ruling by providing the defendant with a right to be "tried
by a jury whose members are selected pursuant to nondiscriminatory criteria."
[d. at 86.
48. The Court reasoned that a jury was designed to protect an individual from
the arbitrary exercise of power by the government. [d. A jury biased against
the defendant, specifically selected for that purpose, would be unable to perform
that protective function. [d. at 86-89.
49. In order to reject the burden of proof requirement, the Court found that prior
cases established that "'a consistent pattern of official racial discrimination' is
not 'a necessary predicate to a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.'" /d.
at 95 (quoting Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252,266 n.14 (1977». Therefore, racial discrimination may be shown by relying
on facts established in the defendant's own case.
50 .. [d. at 96.
51. [d. (quoting Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953».
52. [d. at 96. The Court suggested that trial courts look for "patterns" of strikes
against black jurors. [d. at 97. Also, the prosecutor's questions and statements
made during voir dire should be examined for discriminatory motive. [d.
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a prima facie case of discrimination. 53 After applying the three-prong
test to the facts in Batson, the Court believed that the exclusion of
the only four blacks on the venire required remanding the case to
enable the trial court to examine these strikes in light of the new
test. 54
After the defendant demonstrates a prima facie case in accordance with the test established by Batson, the burden shifts to the
prosecutor to "come forward with a neutral explanation for challenging black jurors. "55 While the prosecutor's explanation need not
be as detailed as a challenge-for-cause justification, it cannot merely
be a simple denial of discriminatory intent. 56
The lower courts spent the years after Batson establishing what
was required for a prima facie showing. Unresolved by Batson were
the following two questions: What constitutes a "cognizable racial
group?" Was the protection applicable only to jurors who were
members of the defendant's race? The next Supreme Court decision
on the issue of discriminatory peremptory challenges answered the
latter question. 57 In doing so, however, the Court began to shift its
focus of concern from the criminal defendant to the affected juror.

III. THE SHIFT TO EQUAL PROTECTION FOR THE
JUROR: POWERS THROUGH McCOLLUM
When the Court established the defendant's right to equal protection in Swain, it recognized that the juror was also affected by
peremptory challenges that were racially discriminatory. A finding
that a defendant's right to equal protection had been violated might
53. "We have confidence that trial judges . .. will be able to decide if the
circumstances concerning the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges creates
a prima facie case of discrimination." Id.
The Chief Justice, while not critical of the lower courts' abilities, expressed
more sympathy for their upcoming plight:
[This decision] leaves roughly 7,000 general jurisdiction State trial
judges and approximately 500 federal judges at large to find their
way through the morass the Court creates today. The Court essentially
wishes these judges well as they begin the difficult enterprise of sorting
out the implications of the Court's newly created "right." I join my
colleagues in wishing the Nation's judges well as they struggle to grasp
how to implement today's holding.
Id. at 131 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
54. Id. at 100.
55. Id. at 97.
56. Id. The Court also held that a challenge would be improper if the prosecutor
issued it based on the belief that the juror would be partial to the defendant
because they are of the same race. Id.
57. See infra, part lILA., discussing the Court's holding in Powers v. Ohio, 499
U.S. 400 (1991).
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also
support a reasonable inference that Negroes are excluded
from juries for reasons wholly unrelated to the outcome of
the particular case on trial and that the peremptory system
is being used to deny the Negro the same right and opportunity to participate in the administration of justice enjoyed
by the white population. s8
In Batson, the Court elaborated on Swain's line of reasoning.
While it was secondary to the rationale that peremptory challenges
based upon racial grounds violated the defendant's right to equal
protection, the Court acknowledged that "[r]acial discrimination in
selection of jurors harms not only the accused," but also the excluded
juror .59 Relating its decision to Strauder, the Court stated that by
"denying a person participation in jury service on account of his
race, the State unconstitutionally discriminated against the excluded
juror. "60
The rights of jurors in Batson were considered, however, secondary to the rights of the defendant. The Court was able to
rationalize that the rights of jurors are secondary because the defendant in Batson was black, and its earlier decision in Strauder was
concerned with the right of an individual to prevent members of his
race from being excluded from jury service on the basis of race.
Batson's argument could not be made if the criminal defendant was
white and the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to strike black
jurors. In this situation, the primary rationale in Batson and Strauder
would be satisfied-a defendant would have the chance to be judged
by members of his own race. Yet, the secondary rationale, the equal
protection rights of a juror, would be violated.

A.

Affected Jurors' Rights v. Prosecutors' Strikes
In 1991, Powers v. Ohio61 brought the question of jurors' rights

to the Court, which embraced the analysis of the equal protection
58. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 224 (1965). See also Strauder v. West
Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880), where the Court stated:
The very fact that colored people are singled out and expressly denied
by a statute all right to participate in the administration of the law,
as jurors, because of their color ... is practically a brand upon them,
affixed by law, an assertion of their inferiority, and a stimulant to
... prejudice.
Id. at 308.
59. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87 (1986).
60. Id. Indeed, the effects went beyond the particular juror "to touch the entire
community ... and undermine public confidence in the fairness of our system
of justice." Id.
61. 499 U.S. 400 (1991). The facts provide that a white defendant was to stand
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rights of jurors in order to find for the defendant. 62 The Court
stressed that the prior rationales of Batson and Strauder were controlling, i.e., that a jury should be selected by non-discriminatory
means. 63 The Court held that the "Equal Protection Clause prohibits
a prosecutor from using the State's peremptory challenges to exclude
otherwise qualified and unbiased persons from the petit jury solely
by reason of their race, a practice that forecloses a significant
opportunity to participate in civic life."64
A violation of the Equal Protection Clause6.5 requires state action66
that deprives an individual of equal protection of the laws. In
addition, in order for an equal protection challenge to be justiciable
in federal courts, the appellant must have standing to sue. 67 Previously, this confined peremptory challenge appeals to the appellant's
own legal rights and interests. 68 Powers switched the focus, however,
from the equal protection rights of the defendant to that of the
juror. In order for Powers to bring suit, therefore, the Court had
to accept the argument that a defendant could assert a juror's equal
protection right under the theory of third-party standing.
The Court has established three elements that must be met before
a claimant can assert a third-party claim:
trial for aggravated murder. [d. at 402. During jury selection, the prosecutor
used seven of ten peremptory challenges to exclude blacks. [d. at 403. After
each strike of a black juror, the defendant, citing Batson, asked the court to
compel the prosecutor to give nondiscriminatory explanations for those strikes.
[d. The court refused to do so and, subsequently, the defendant was convicted.
[d.

62. [d. at 402. The first sentence of Justice Kennedy's majority opinion focused
on jury service as being "an exercise of responsible citizenship." [d. This set
the tone of the opinion's focus on the juror and not the defendant.
63. [d. at 404. The Court acknowledged that its prior holdings concerning the
peremptory challenge hinged primarily on the equal protection rights of a
defendant. [d. at 404-06. However, it also felt that "Batson 'was designed to
serve multiple ends.'" [d. at 406 (quoting Allen v. Hardy, 478 U.S. 255, 259
(1986) (per curiam».
64. [d. at 409.
65. "No State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
66. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S, 163, 172 (1972) (stating that discriminatory action by a state violates Equal Protection Clause, while private conduct
does not). Although the Fifth Amendment does not contain an Equal Protection
Clause, its Due Process Clause has been held to impose the same requirements
on the Federal government as the Fourteenth Amendment imposes on the
states. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954). In Powers, and in all prior
cases involving the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges, the state action
element was easily satisfied because the peremptory challenges in question had
been issued by the prosecutor, a quintessential state actor.
67. See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410 (1991) (citing United States Dept. of
Labor v. Triplett, 494 U.S. 715, 720 (1990); Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106
(1976».
68. See Powers, 499 U.S. at 410.
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[A] litigant may raise a claim on behalf of a third party if
the litigant can demonstrate[:]
[1] that he or she has suffered a concrete, redress able
injury,
[2] that he or she has a close relation with the third
party, and
[3] that there exists some hindrance to the third party's
ability to protect his or her own interests. 69

The Court applied these elements in Powers, holding that the criminal
defendant did indeed have standing to challenge a juror's exclusion. 70
The decision in Powers v. Ohio took the right of equal protection
away from the criminal defendant and placed it squarely on the
prospective juror. Once in place, it seemed only reasonable that the
right would attach whenever a juror was being selected. Therefore,
the result in Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 71 presented to the
Court later in the same term, should have been anticipated.

B.

Affected Jurors' Rights v. Civil Litigants' Strikes
Edmonson presented a Batson claim of race-based peremptory
challenges, but in a civil as opposed to a criminal proceeding. 72
Because the decision in Powers established that a third party had the
standing to raise the claims of a juror, only one hurdle remained to
prove an equal protection violation. Thus far, the questionable
69. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 629 (1991).
70. Powers, 499 U.S. at 415. The first element was proved by reiterating the
interests of the criminal defendant:
The discriminatory use of peremptory challenges by the prosecution
causes a criminal defendant cognizable injury ... because racial
discrimination in the selection of jurors "casts doubt on the integrity
of the judicial process," and places the fairness of the criminal
proceeding in doubt.
[d. at 411 (quoting Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 556 (1979».
As to the second element, the Court recognized that a "relation, if not a
bond of trust" develops between the juror and the defendant. [d. at 413. It
also found that both parties have an interest in eliminating racial discrimination
from the process. [d.
The third element was met even though jurors have a legal right to sue
on their own behalf. [d. at 414. The Court recognized that such a suit was
"rare" because it provided minimal incentive and contained "daunting" barriers. [d.
71. 500 U.S. 614 (1991).
72. The plaintiff had sued Leesville Concrete claiming that its negligence had
caused him personal injury. [d. at 616. Leesville used two of its three peremptory challenges to strike black jurors. [d. The plaintiff, who is black, cited
Batson, and asked the court to compel Leesville to give a nondiscriminatory
explanation for those strikes. [d. The court refused, stating that Batson did
not apply to civil trials. [d.
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peremptory challenges had been issued in a criminal setting by a
prosecutor; therefore, the state action requirement was easily satisfied. But, in a civil proceeding, neither side appeared to be a "state
actor. "73 The Court applied, however, the two-prong analysis of
Lugar v. Edmonson Oil CO.,74 and found that peremptory challenges
issued by either side in a civil proceeding constituted state action.7s
The Lugar test states:
First, the deprivation must be caused by the exercise of
some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of
conduct imposed by the State or by a person for whom the
State is responsible ....
Second, the party charged with the deprivation must be
a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor. This
may be because he is a state official, because he has acted
together with or has obtained significant aid from state
officials, or because his conduct is otherwise chargeable to
the State. 76
The Court had no difficulty finding that the first prong was
satisfied because peremptory challenges were a statutory tool created
by the state. 77 The Court had greater difficulty justifying its rationale
with respect to the second prong. 78 The Court reasoned that but for
the state, the jury would be unavailable to the participants in the
first place. 79 In addition, a private party "invokes the formal authority of the court, which must discharge the prospective juror.' '80
The end result is that when private parties "participate in the selection
of jurors, they serve an iinportant function within the government
and act with its substantial assistance. "81
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

See supra note 66.
457 U.S. 922 (1982).
Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 620-28.
Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937.
"[P]eremptory challenges have no significance outside a court of law." Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 620. The Court recognized that peremptory challenges
are not constitutionally mandated. Id. (citing Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81,
88 (1988); Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 586 (1919». Therefore,
without statutory authorization, the civil party would not be able to engage in
discriminatory acts. Id. at 621.
78. In examining the second prong, the Court relied on precedent to establish three
relevant inquiries: 1) "[T]he extent to which the actor relies on governmental
assistance and benefits;" 2) "whether the actor is performing a traditional
governmental function;" and 3) "whether the injury caused is aggravated in a
unique way by the incidents of government authority." Id. (citations omitted).
79. "[A] private party could not exercise its peremptory challenges absent the
overt, significant assistance of the court. The government summons jurors,
constrains their freedom of movement, and subjects them to public scrutiny
and examination." Id. at 624.
80.Id.
81. Id. at 628.
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Accordingly, after Edmonson, the right of jurors to be protected
against race-based peremptory challenges was applicable to the prosecutor and both parties in a civil suit. The one party conspicuously
missing from this scheme was the criminal defendant-the party
Strauder and Batson originally meant to protect. In 1992, relying on
its past decisions, the Supreme Court addressed this last element still
affecting jurors.
C.

Affected Jurors' Rights v. Criminal Defendants' Strikes
Georgia v. McCollum 82 came to the Court with many commen-

tators expecting the Court to finally restrict the criminal defendant
from exercising peremptory challenges based on race. 83 With the
switch in emphasis away from the equal protection right of the
defendant, there seemed little reason to allow the defendant the
continued ability to discriminate.84 In order to advance the rights of
jurors over those of a criminal defendant, four main questions needed
to be addressed by the Court: 8S
First, whether a criminal defendant's exercise of peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner inflicts the harms addressed by Batson.
82. 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992).
83. See Chesney & Gallagher, supra note 38; J. Alexander Tanford, Racism in the
Adversary System: The Defendant's Use of Peremptory Challenges, 63 S. CAL.
L. REv. 1015 (1990); Barbara D. Underwood, Ending Race Discrimination in
Jury Selection: Whose Right is it Anyway?, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 725 (1992).
84. Even prior to Batson, the inequities of providing only the defendant with the
ability to object to racially motivated peremptory challenges was recognized.
In 1984, Judge Richard Posner stated the basic line of reasoning that lead to
the McCollum decision.
It would be hard to argue that only a defendant should be allowed
to challenge racially motivated peremptory challenges. Suppose counsel
for a white defendant thought his client would be more likely to be
acquitted if there were no blacks on the jury, and therefore used all
his peremptory challenges to exclude blacks. As it cannot be right to
believe that racial discrimination is wrong only when it harms a
criminal defendant, and not when it harms the law-abiding community
represented by the prosecutor, the prosecutor would be allowed to
object to defendant's making racial peremptory challenges if the
defendant could object to the prosecutor's doing so.
United States v. Clark, 737 F.2d 679, 682 (7th Cir. 1984). For another
McCollum prediction, see Chief Justice Burger's dissent in Batson, where he
stated:
the clear and inescapable import of this novel holding will inevitably
be to limit the use of this valuable tool to both prosecutors and
defense attorneys alike. Once the Court has held that prosecutors are
limited in their use of peremptory challenges, could we rationally hold
that defendants are not?
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 125-26 (1986) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)
(footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
85. Although several of these questions were dealt with in previous cases, they
needed to be specifically tailored in order to apply to the criminal defendant.
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Second, whether the exercise of peremptory challenges
by a criminal defendant constitutes state action.
Third, whether prosecutors have standing to raise this
constitutional challenge.
And fourth, whether the constitutional rights of a criminal defendant nonetheless preclude the extension of our
precedents to this case. 86
In answering the first issue, the Court almost rewrote the primary
rationale of Batson. The decision in Batson was premised upon the
equal protection rights of the criminal defendant. 87 Yet, in McCollum,
the Court stressed only the right of the juror: "Regardless of who
invokes the discriminatory challenge, there can be no doubt that the
harm is the same-in all cases, the juror is subjected to open and
public racial discrimination." 88
The second issue, the criminal defendant as a state actor, should
have been the most troublesome for the Court to overcome. Although
the Court previously found that civil litigants were state actors in
their use of peremptory challenges,89 viewing the criminal defendant
in this light seemed contrary to the criminal justice system. 90 The
Court found, however, the Edmonson decision to be directly related
to the present situation, and labeled the criminal defendant as a state
actor when using peremptory challenges. 91

86. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2353.
87. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text. In Batson, the juror's rights
were considered, but were seen as secondary to the rights of the criminal
defendant. The first element in McCollum considers the "harms addressed by
Batson," yet a true reading of Batson would require examining what harms
were caused to the criminal defendant and not the juror.
88. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2353. The Court also discussed another strong thread
running through prior opinions-how overt discrimination affects public confidence in the justice system. [d. at 2353-54 (citations omitted).
89. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991).
90. See infra, part V.A. for a discussion of this apparent contradiction.
91. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2354-56. The Court applied the two prong test of
Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982). See supra text accompanying
note 76. Again, as in Edmonson, the "source in state authority" prong was
established because the peremptory challenge is a right granted by state statute.
McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2355.
In discussing the "party as a state actor" prong, the Court also adopted
the three step inquiry set out in Edmonson. See supra text accompanying note
69. As to the first inquiry, the court stated, "the defendant in a Georgia
criminal case relies on 'governmental assistance and benefits' that are equivalent
to those found in the civil context." McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2355 (quoting
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 621 (1991». As to the
second inquiry, the Court used some interesting logic when it held that the
defendant was performing a traditional government function when selecting a
jury: "[P)eremptory challenges perform a traditional function of the govern-
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The Court also dismissed the defendant's claim that the adversarial relationship with the government negated any possibility of
state" action. 92 The Court concluded that the peremptory challenge
was different than any other action an accused may take in his
defense. 93 In using the peremptory challenge, the defendant "is
wielding the power to choose a quintessential government body."94
The third issue, third-party standing, was handled in the same
manner in which the Court dealt with third-party standing in Powers
and Edmonson. 9S Any party can claim third-party standing for an
affected juror because the harm defined by the Court in Powers is
applicable to all. 96 According to the Court, the harm stated was the
casting of "'doubt on the integrity of the judicial process."'97 The
state was thought to have an even stronger relationship to jurors
than either party approved of in Powers and Edmonson. 98
Lastly, the Court examined the direct conflict between the primary and secondary interests expressed in Batson. 99 Based upon the

92.

93.
94.

95.
96.
97.
98.

99.

ment [in selecting the jury] .... [T]he jury system in turn 'performs the
critical government functions of guarding the rights of litigants .... '" [d.
(quoting Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 624). Given this background, the Court
determined that anyone party wielding a peremptory challenge was performing
a traditional government function. The final issue to be addressed in examining
the second prong was whether the injury had been aggravated by governmental
authority. The Court held that its ruling in Edmonson was directly on point.
[d. at 2356. A "courtroom setting intensifies the harmful effects" of a
discriminatory peremptory challenge. [d.
[d. at 2356. The defendant relied on Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312
(1981), where the Court held that a public defender could be viewed as acting
under color of state law when representing a criminal defendant. Polk County,
454 U.S. at 324-25. In McCollum, the Court stated that the basis for the Polk
County decision was not the adversarial relationship between the defense and
the prosecution: "[i]nstead, the determination whether a public defender is a
state actor for a particular purpose depends on the nature and context of the
function he is performing." McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2356. Focusing on the
function involved allowed the Court to divide the public defender's duties so
that some could be characterized as state actions. See, e.g., Branti v. Finkel,
445 U.S. 507 (1980) (holding that public defender is state actor when making
personnel decisions).
McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2356.
[d. That a peremptory challenge was being used to further the defendant's
acquittal did not matter: "Whenever a private actor's conduct is deemed 'fairly
attributable' to the government, it is likely that private motives will have
animated the actor's decision." [d.
See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2357.
[d. (quoting Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 411 (1991».
[d. at 2357. "As the representative of all its citizens, the State is the logical
and proper party to assert the invasion of the constitutional rights of the
excluded jurors in a criminal trial." [d.
[d. at 2357-58. "The final question is whether the interests served by Batson
must give way to the rights of a criminal defendant." [d.
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Court's modified equal protection focus, little doubt existed as to
which party's right would prevail. The Court began with the reminder
that "peremptory challenges are not constitutionally protected fundamental rights." 100 It further stated that the challenges could be
withheld altogether without affecting the constitutional rights of the
defendant. 101
The Court recognized the long history of the peremptory challenge, and indicated that it thought the practice could continue to
meet constitutional guidelines. 102 The Court then stated the following:
'''[I]f race stereotypes are the price for acceptance of a jury panel
as fair,' we reaffirm today that such a 'price is too high to meet the
standard of the Constitution." '103
The holding in McCollum should have come as no great surprise
to the legal community. Further, McCollum should have little procedural impact on the system because Batson challenges have been
widely litigated since that 1986 decision. I04 The lower courts have
spent much of that time developing guidelines for recognizing and
reviewing claims of discrimination in the context of jury selection.
The Court was able to regulate the use of peremptory challenges by
the prosecution under Batson. McCollum merely adds the final actor,
the defendant, to the court's control.
IV. MARYLAND AND THE EQUAL PROTECTION RIGHTS
OF JURORS
With the focus of equal protection on the juror, Maryland and
other state courts have had to redevelop their guidelines for reviewing
claims of discrimination in the context of jury selection. Many states
were able to accept the more "minor" intrusion of Batson, and

100. [d. at 2358.
101. [d.
102. [d. The Court recognized that there was a difference between excluding a juror
who harbored racial prejudices-an allowable practice-and excluding a juror
on the assumption that the juror's race says something about her possible
prejudices-an unconstitutional practice. [d. at 2359.
103. [d. at 2358 (quoting Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 630
(1991». Although the majority used the phrase "criminal defendant" throughout its opinion, Justice Thomas, in concurrence, saw McCollum's application
as narrower: "Today, we decide only that white defendants may not strike
black veniremen on the basis of race. Eventually, we will have to decide
whether black defendants may strike white veniremen." /d. at 2360 (Thomas,
J., concurring).
104. Several of the states that adopted the Batson guarantee earlier have had a few
more years to work on procedure. See People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748, 762
(Cal. 1978); State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481, 486-87 (Fla. 1984); Commonwealth
v. Soares, 387 N.E.2d 499, 515-16 (Mass.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979).
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worked specifically within its guidelines.lO~ Other states went beyond
that decision, anticipating the expansion of Powers, Edmonson, and
McCollum. I06 In any event, the juror has been afforded an equal
protection right, and in most cases it is up to the states to ensure
that right. Part A of this section reviews the Maryland decisions that
have enforced Batson and developed workable rules for its daily
implementation. Part B examines a recent trend in Maryland and
federal case law to limit appellate review in cases concerning the
equal protection rights of jurors. Part C reviews how Batson fits
within the Maryland Constitution and whether the courts are willing
to expand upon this concept.

A.

Batson Comes to Maryland

There are two main issues in any Batson challenge of suspect
peremptory strikes. The first issue is whether the defendant has
shown a prima facie case of discriminatory peremptory challenges. 107
105. As the next section will reveal, Maryland fits into this category of states.
106. See State v. Levinson, 795 P.2d 845 (Haw. 1990); State v. Alvarado, 534 A.2d
440 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1987); People v. Kern, 554 N.E.2d 1235 (N.Y.),
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 824 (1990). Some courts went well beyond the Batson
holding. In State v. Scholl, 743 P.2d 406 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987), the court
addressed the issue of a prosecutor's discriminatory nonuse of his peremptory
challenges. Scholl, 743 P .2d at 407. In the jury selection process at issue, the
jury venire consisted of twenty-four persons. [d. The venire's only black
member was number twenty-three on the list. [d. The defense counsel used all
six allotted peremptory challenges. [d. The prosecutor struck, however, only
four from the venire, leaving fourteen. [d.
In order to seat the twelve person jury, the clerk was required to strike
the last two persons on the venire list. [d. The defendant claimed that because
the prosecutor failed to use all of his peremptory challenges, the sole black
member of the jury venire was excluded. [d. The trial court held that a prima
facie case of discriminatory peremptory challenges had been established. [d. at
409. After hearing, and not accepting, the prosecutor's reason for not using
all of his strikes, that "it was his practice not to exercise all of his peremptory
challenges unless he had a reason for doing so," the trial court agreed to
declare a mistrial so that the State could appeal. [d. at 407-08.
On appeal, the State argued that "the ruling in Batson applies only where
the elimination of prospective jurors results from the affirmative exercise of
peremptory challenges." [d. at 409. The court of appeals did "not believe that
Batson should be read so narrowly .... There is no reason to differentiate
between use and nonuse of peremptory challenges in determining whether the
State is engaging in purposeful discrimination in its selection of jurors." [d.
Yet the court of appeals while agreeing with the trial court that a prima facie
case had been established, overruled the trial court's determination as to actual
discrimination. [d. Recognizing that Batson did not require that the lone black
juror be seated on the jury, the court of appeals found the prosecutor's
reasoning to be race neutral. [d. at 409-10.
107. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96-97 (1986).
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The second issue is whether the prosecutor has come forward with
proper neutral explanations for those challenges. lOS Much of the early
post-Batson case law was concerned with the issue of when a prima
facie case had been established.
Before the Court shifted its emphasis toward protecting the
rights of the juror, the Maryland courts accepted the Batson definition concerning the establishment of a prima facie case of discriminatory peremptory challenges. According to the Court of Appeals
of Maryland, the defendant:
1. must show that he is a member of a cognizable racial
group, and that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory
challenges to remove from the venire members of the defendant's race;
2. is entitled to rely on the fact that peremptory <;hallenges
constitute a jury selection practice that permits those to
discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate;
3. must show that those facts and any other relevant circumstances raise [a rebuttable presumption] that the prosecutor used that practice to exclude veniremen from the petit
jury on account of their race. 109
Early cases gave the court of appeals an opportunity to examine the
prima facie issue in a de novo review because most of the trial
objections were issued under the burden of proof standard articulated
in Swain v. Alabama. lIo Consequently, the Batson standard was not
applied in the trial setting. III
In Stanley v. State, JJ2 the court of appeals held that the prosecutor'suse of 80070 of his peremptory challenges l13 to remove blacks
from the jury venire established a prima facie case of discrimina108. Id. at 97.
109. Maryland v. Gorman, 315 Md. 402, 410, 554 A.2d 1203, 1207 (1989) (citing
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986», vacated, 499 U.S. 971 (1991).
110. 380 U.S. 202 (1965); see supra note 35 and accompanying text.
III. If Batson had been cited in order to question a prosecutor's use of a peremptory
challenge, the case was too new for the trial courts to understand the extent
of its application. As one judge said: "I will tell you at this point I am the
lowly trial judge, and I am at a loss as to what to do .... Maybe at some
later date someone will tell me how to do it. They will have a problem, a real
problem." Stanley v. State, 313 Md. SO, 68, 542 A.2d 1267, 1275-76 (1988).
112. 313 Md. SO, 542 A.2d 1267 (1988).
1l3. In Maryland, the number of peremptory challenges allowed per party is
governed by the Maryland Rules. For criminal cases, the defendant and the
prosecutor are allowed four strikes each, with additional strikes being added
as the severity of the sentence increases. MD. RULES 4-3l3(a) (1993). In civil
actions, each side is allowed four peremptory challenges, with additional strikes
permitted according to the number of alternate jurors to be impanelled. MD.
RULES 2-512(h) (1993).
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tion.1I4 Following the Supreme Court's reasoning in Batson, the court
of appeals determined that Maryland would examine all of the
relevant circumstances in the selection procedure when addressing
their constitutionality. lIS
In Tolbert v. State,1I6 the prosecutor used his first four peremptory challenges to strike black jurors. 1I7 As a result of the prosecutor's
actions, the court began to recognize the sometimes informal manner
in which a Batson challenge will be raised and then dealt with by
the trial court.
Although the trial court did not expressly so state, the clear
implication raised by the court in calling for the prosecutor
to explain why he was striking only black individuals was
that the court believed that Tolbert had met his burden to
make a prima facie showing of racial discrimination. 1I8
The trial court determined that Tolbert had established a prima facie
case even though his defense counsel only mentioned to the judge
that the first four peremptory challenges had been used on black
jurors, and had made no "formal" Batson challenge.'19 The court
of appeals concluded that the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges constituted "a prima facie showing of racial discrimination." 120
Much of the early post-Batson case law across the country
focused on the proper establishment of a prima facie case of discriminatory peremptory challenges. Most jurisdictions did not set any
114. Stanley, 313 Md. at 73, 542 A.2d at 1278. That three blacks remained on the
final jury panel was not determinative. "'[T]he question is whether the state
exercised any of its strikes for a racially discriminatory reason .... '" [d. at
72, 542 A.2d at 1278 (quoting Powell v. State, 355 S.E.2d 72, 73 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1987) (emphasis added».
In a companion case, Trice v. State, the jury array contained only one
black member. When the prosecutor used a peremptory challenge to strike this
individual from the panel, the defendant made a Batson claim. [d. at 82, 542
A.2d at 1282. Due to Batson's new status, however, the prosecutor did not
believe he had to explain his peremptory challenges, and the judge let the
matter drop. [d. at 82-83, 542 A.2d at 1283. In light of this event, and the
fact that no black would serve on the jury, the court of appeals felt a prima
facie case of discriminatory peremptory challenges had been proven. [d. at 8788, 542 A.2d at 1285.
115. For example, a court would look for "a 'pattern' of strikes against black
jurors in the particular venire, or the prosecutor's questions and statements
during the voir dire examination and the exercise of peremptory challenges
might give rise to or support or refute the requisite showing." [d. at 60-61,
542 A.2d at 1272 (citing Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97 (1986».
116. 315 Md. 13, 553 A.2d 228 (1989).
117. [d. at 17, 553 A.2d at 230.
118. [d. at 18, 553 A.2d at 230.
119. [d.
120. [d.
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specific limits regarding how many jurors needed to be struck before
a prima facie case could be shown. 121 Those jurisdictions took an
approach similar to Stanley, where all or nearly all of the government's peremptory challenges needed to be used on blacks in order
to establish a prima facie case. 122 But again, the Batson challenge
tended to be informal and more often than not the judge was willing
to ask the prosecutor for Justification. As Tolbert pointed out, the
quick decision to ask for justification established a prima facie case,
whether the judge meant to or not. 123
The second issue to be addressed in a Batson analysis is the
prosecutor's justification for using the peremptory challenges. Developing guidelines to evaluate this justification proved to be more
troublesome to the Court than the initial prima facie issue. Once a
prima facie case is established "[a] new trial will be required if the
State cannot produce satisfactory nondiscriminatory reasons for every
peremptory challenge exercised to exclude a black juror." 124 "The
State has the burden of showing that 1) a reason other than the race
of the juror did exist, and 2) the reason has some reasonable nexus
to the case and was in fact the motivating factor in the exercise of
the challenge." 125
121. In these early cases, it should be noted that the law was focused upon the
rights of the criminal defendant. The striking of a juror had to affect the
defendant, unlike present law, where the strike is examined for its effect on a
particular juror. Therefore, the exclusion of one juror alone rarely raised an
issue.
122. See United States v. Battle, 836 F.2d 1084 (8th Cir. 1987) (prima facie case
established where prosecutor used five of six peremptory challenges to strike
five of the seven blacks from the jury panel); Fleming v. Kemp, 794 F.2d 1478
(lith Cir. 1986) (prima facie case established where prosecutor used eight of
ten peremptory challenges to strike eight of the ten blacks from the jury panel);
Ex Parte Branch, 526 So. 2d 609 (Ala. 1987) (prima facie case established
where prosecutor excluded six of the seven blacks from the jury venire); Powell
v. State, 355 S.E.2d 72 (Ga. 1987) (use of nine of ten peremptory challenges
to exclude nine of the twelve blacks from the jury panel established prima
facie case).
Some courts were also willing to find a prima facie case when all available
blacks were excluded from the panel. See United States v. Cloyd, 819 F.2d
836 (8th Cir. 1987) (sole black excluded); United States v. Love, 815 F.2d 53
(8th Cir.) (sole black excluded), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 861 (1987); United
States v. Thompson, 827 F.2d 1254 (9th Cir. 1987) (all four blacks on panel
excluded).
Maryland courts now allow an inference of discrimination to be drawn
from the fact that one hundred percent of a protected group's members have
been struck from the panel, even if the group was originally represented by
only one member. Mejia v. State, 328 Md. 522, 616 A.2d 356 (1992).
123. This set up a much easier avenue for appeal than if the trial judge had
dismissed the claim outright. See infra part IV.C.
124. Stanley v. State, 313 Md. 50, 92, 542 A.2d 1267, 1288 (1988).
125. Chew v. State, 317 Md. 233, 247, 562 A.2d 1270, 1277 (1989).
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A prosecutor must make such a showing for every questionable
strike because the "State will not be allowed one 'free discriminatory
strike.'''126 This rationale appears to fit nicely with the changing
nature of the right created by Batson and its current concern with
the individual juror .127 The court of appeals has held that once a
prima facie case of discriminatory peremptory challenges is established, the end result of the jury selection is immaterial with respect
to the explanation for challenging black jurors. 128 Even if the process
concludes with twelve black jurors trying the case of a black defendant, the prosecutor will still need to provide a nondiscriminatory
reason for "every peremptory challenge exercised to exclude a black
juror. "129
The level of justification required of a prosecutor is usually not
that demanding. It can be imagined that a variety of nondiscriminatory reasons could be conjured up by an offending prosecutor who
does not want to admit to using race-based peremptory challenges. 13o
The courts have followed the Supreme Court in holding that the
state's justifications for its peremptory challenges "need not rise to
the level justifying exercise of a challenge for cause ... [and) reasons
need not be scientifically verifiable or politically pleasing. They need
only be honest and racially neutral."131
126. Stanley, 313 Md. at 93, 542 A.2d at 1288.
127. When examining the equal protection right granted in Batson, it would be
rational to assume that the final analysis would focus on the pattern of strikes
by the prosecutor. With the right centered on the defendant, it may be argued
that discriminating against one juror will not deprive a defendant of equal
protection-a violation depends on whether the government's peremptory challenges have affected the final panel.
With the equal protection right on the juror, however, the government's
reason for striking each and every juror becomes important, because the
violation occurs with respect to the individual. In these instances, the end result
of the selection process would not matter.
128. Tolbert v. State, 315 Md. 13, 19, 553 A.2d 228, 232 (1989).
129. [d. (citing Stanley, 313 Md. at 92, 542 A.2d at 1288). This view is consistent
with the Supreme Court's view in Batson. However, the Tolbert court's view
seems a more fitting rationale for applying the equal protection right of the
juror.
130. See generally Chew v. State, 317 Md. 233, 562 A.2d 1270 (1989) (holding that
peremptory challenge was justified because the juror's occupation was shown
as a laborer-generally the same employment background as defendant); Brashear v. State, 90 Md. App. 709, 603 A.2d 901 (1992) (holding that peremptory
challenge was justified because juror had long hair, dressed casually, and made
eye contact with defendant in a manner which suggested sympathy with
defendant); Simpkins v. State, 79 Md. App. 687, 558 A.2d 816 (1989) (holding
that peremptory challenge was justified because prospective juror worked for
Social Security Administration and those who do that work are seen as
sympathetic to defendants).
131. Stanley v. State, 85 Md. App. 92, 100-01, 582 A.2d 532, 536 (1990) (citation
omitted), on remand from 313 Md. 50, 542 A.2d 1267 (1988) [hereinafter
Stanley 11]. But see supra note 56 and accompanying text.
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Because Batson was being used to protect the defendant's equal
protection right, the courts have allowed justifications based upon
age,132 occupation,133 and until recently, gender. J34 Nevertheless, courts
have refused to allow justifications based upon appearance and
demeanor, warning prosecutors: "[T]his may be a difficult explanation to sustain. "13S Recognizing the rationale in Justice Marshall's
concurring opinion in Batson, the court of special appeals has stated
the following:
A prosecutor's own conscious or unconscious racism may
lead him easily to the conclusion that a prospective black
juror is "sullen" or "distant," a characterization that would
not have come to his mind if a white juror had acted
identically. A judge's own conscious or unconscious racism
may lead him to accept such an explanation as well supported. J36
Early in the post-Batson period this rationale commanded some
respect; however, recent decisions have relaxed such scrutiny.
B.

Extending Batson in Maryland

When the Supreme Court switched its emphasis from the equal
protection rights of the defendant to those. of the juror, Maryland
seemed to forestall an expansive application of Batson challenges.
Part of the problem resulted from the early post-Batson decisions in
which the Court of Appeals of Maryland first recognized the right
as applicable to criminal defendants. When Maryland adopted Batson
in Stanley v. State,137 it did so because the United States Constitution
required it to do so, and not because the Maryland Constitution
compelled such a guarantee. J38 In adopting Batson, however, the
court of appeals continued to affirm that the peremptory challenge
132. See, e.g., Chew, 317 Md. at 245, 562 A.2d at 1276.
133. [d.
134. Tolbert v. State, 315 Md. 13,23 n.7, 553 A.2d 228, 232 n.7 (1989). In Tolbert,
the court stated, "[W]e have no need to reach and expressly do not decide
whether the rulings of Batson v. Kentucky extend to gender or other discrimination in the use of peremptory challenges." [d. (citation omitted). For the
current treatment of gender-based peremptory challenges, see infra notes 14871 and accompanying text and notes 224-32 and accompanying text.
135. Chew, 317 Md. at 247, 562 A.2d at 1277.
136. Stanley II, 85 Md. App. at 105,582 A.2d at 538 (quoting Batson v. Kentucky,
476 U.S. 79, 106 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring».
137. 313 Md. 50, 542 A.2d 1267 (1988).
138. [d. at 63, 542 A.2d at 73. See also Gray v. State, 317 Md. 250, 252, 562 A.2d
1278, 1279 (1989); State v. Gorman, 315 Md. 402, 417, 554 A.2d 1203, 1210
(1989), vacated, 499 U.S. 971 (1991); Tolbert, 315 Md. at 24, 553 A.2d at
232-33.
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was an important part of the trial of an accused and should not be
abolished. 139
Maryland courts have employed their reverent attitude toward
an accused's use of peremptory challenges frequently, never extending
the equal protection right beyond what the Supreme Court specifically
detailed. In State v. Gorman,14O the court of appeals heard its first
Batson claim from a white defendant. 141 However, because Gorman
I was decided before Powers v. Ohio,142 the court of appeals refused
to recognize the equal protection rights of the black jurors. Utilizing
the foilowing rationale, the court declined to go beyond the Supreme
Court:
We have learned that it is not wise to prophesy what the
Supreme Court will do or to anticipate how it will rule
when an unresolved question comes before it. We are content, as was the Supreme Court, to leave the determination
of issues unresolved in Batson to future litigation. 143
The court's decision in Gorman I is somewhat understandable,
because when the decision was rendered the Supreme Court only
recognized the equal protection right of the criminal defendant. The
court of appeals in Gorman I was "unable to conceive of a sound
rationalization as to how the peremptory striking of blacks from the
. . . panel would deny a white defendant equal protection of the
laws. "1:44
139. The court adopted language from Batson: "'[N]or do we think that this historic
trial practice, which long has served the selection of an impartial jury, should
be abolished .... '" Stanley, 313 Md. at 63,542 A.2d at 1273 (quoting Batson
v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 99 n.22 (1986».
140. 315 Md. 402, 554 A.2d 1203 (1989), [hereinafter Gorman 1], vacated, 499 U.S.
971 (1991).
141. At trial, when the prosecutor excluded the only two blacks from the panel,
the trial judge refused to hear the Batson challenge made by the defendant.
Id. at 404, 554 A.2d at 1204. In the defendant's initial appeal, the decision of
the trial court was affirmed by the court of special appeals. Gorman v. State,
No. 85-897 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Mar. 11, 1986) (unreported). His appeal via
certiorari was denied by the court of appeals, but was subsequently granted
by the U.S. Supreme Court. Gorman v. Maryland, 480 U.S. 913 (1987). The
Court remanded for further consideration in light of Griffith v. Kentucky, 479
U.S. 314 (1987) (holding that in some circumstances Batson may be applied
retroactively). On remand, the court of special appeals reversed the trial court
and remanded for a new trial. Gorman I, 315 Md. at 405, 554 A.2d at 1204.
The state appealed from this decision and certiorari was granted by the court
of appeals. Id.
142. 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
143. Gorman I, 315 Md. at 415-16, 554 A.2d at 1209.
144. Id. at 416, 554 A.2d at 1210. Before the court of appeals could take such a
step, the Supreme Court had to change its focus from the equal protection
right of the criminal defendant to the equal protection right of the juror.
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After the Supreme Court's decision in Powers, and the attachment of the equal protection right to the juror, 14S Gorman //146 was
heard. Given this new direction by the Supreme Court, the court of
appeals found that a prima facie case of discrimination was established in the striking of the two black jurors. 147
With the right to equal protection for the juror firmly established
by the Supreme Court in Powers, the court of special appeals, in
Eiland v. State,148 refused to extend that protection to cover peremptory challenges based on gender. The court of special appeals cited
Gorman I for the proposition that equal protection coverage should
not be extended beyond what the Supreme Court had specifically
stated. 149 It should be noted, however, that in Gorman I the court
of appeals could not imagine how the equal protection right could
be expanded to cover a white defendant. ISO In Eiland, however, the
court had no problem recognizing that such an equal protection right
should probably exist:
[I]t is hard to imagine how the scrutiny of the Equal
Protection Clause could stop at discrimination aimed only
at blacks and Hispanics rather than being aimed at racially
motivated peremptories used against members of any race.
It is hard to imagine why it should not also be aimed at
gender-based peremptories directed at women or at men. It
is hard to imagine that it should not be aimed at peremptories based upon a juror's religion. lSI
Because the Supreme Court had yet to extend Batson to cover gender,
and the court of appeals had never accepted the Batson guarantee
as part of Maryland's constitutional law, the court of special appeals
refused to do what it deemed rational.
It is arguable that the Eiland court had specific guidance in the
Maryland Constitution to enable it to reach a different result. As
. discussed previously, the right to equal protection in the use of
peremptory challenges should extend to all suspect classifications. ls2
Maryland's Constitution has an Equal Rights Amendment that makes

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

See supra notes 61-70 and accompanying text.
State v. Gorman, 324 Md. 124, 596 A.2d 629 (1991) [hereinafter Gorman II).
Id. at 129, 596 A.2d at 631.
92 Md. App. 56, 607 A.2d 42 (1992), rev'd sub nom. Tyler v. State, 330 Md.
261, 623 A.2d 648 (1993).
Id. at 90-91, 607 A.2d at 59.
Gorman I, 315 Md. 402, 416, 554 A.2d 1203, 1209-10 (1989), vacated, 499
U.S. 971 (1991).
Eiland, 92 Md. App. at 88, 607 A.2d at 58.
See supra text accompanying note 49.

1993]

The Peremptory Challenge

249

all gender classifications suspect. IS3 Prior to Eiland, states with similar
protections had expanded the scope of Batson to include genderbased peremptory challenges. ls4 In Eiland, the court of special appeals' refusal to do so was grounded on the basis that the Batson
right had never been accepted under the Maryland Constitution in
the first place. ISS When Eiland was heard on review with a companion
case, Tyler v. State, the Court of Appeals of Maryland addressed
both the Maryland constitutional issue and the gender issue. ls6
In Tyler, the court of appeals' first step was to include the
Batson protection within the Maryland Constitution. ls7 In deciding
Batson, the Supreme Court relied on the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. lss Although Maryland has no express
equal protection clause, the Tyler court recognized that the concept
of equal treatment is embodied in Article 24 of the Maryland
Declaration of Rights, which is Maryland's functional equivalent of
the Fourteenth Amendment. ls9 While Maryland courts must follow
the Supreme Court's directives as issued through the Fourteenth
Amendment, adoption into Maryland constitutional law requires
specific acknowledgment. l60 In Tyler, the court of appeals recognized
past case law that equated the federal clause with its Maryland
counterpart. 161 Having determined that Supreme Court decisions are

153. MD. CONST. art. 46 states the following: "Equality of rights under the law
shall not be abridged or denied because of sex." The effect of this article is
to render all "state-sanctioned sex-based classifications suspect." State v.
Burning Tree Club, Inc., 315 Md. 254, 269, 554 A.2d 366, 374, cert. denied,
493 U.S. 816 (1989).
154. See State v. Burch, 830 P.2d 357 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992). In Burch, the court
stated that the "protections provided by the ERA go beyond those of the equal
protection guaranty under the federal constitution." Id. at 362 (citations
omitted).
155. "The Batson principle ... is not and never has been a part of Maryland law.
We cannot extend what we have never adopted." Eiland, 92 Md. App. at 92,
607 A.2d at 60.
156. Tyler v. State, 330 Md. 261, 623 A.2d 648 (1993).
157. Id. at 265, 623 A.2d at 650.
158. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85 (1986).
159. Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights states, "[N]o man ought to
be taken or imprisoned or disseized of his freehold, liberties or privileges, or
outlawed, or exiled, or, in any manner, destroyed, or deprived of his life,
liberty or property, but by the judgment of his peers, or by the Law of the
land." MD. CONST. art. 24.
160. See Erbe v. State, 276 Md. 541, 544-45, 350 A.2d 640, 642 (1976); Smith v.
State, 276 Md. 521, 527, 350 A.2d 628, 632 (1976).
161. The court stated the proposition as follows:
[W)e deem it settled that this concept of equal treatment is embodied
in the due process requirement of Article 24 of the Declaration of
Rights .... Article 24 has been interpreted to apply 'in like manner
and to the same extent as the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal
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"'persuasive as we undertake to interpret Article 24,"'162 the court
of appeals brought Batson within Maryland constitutional protection:
"So we are brought within the Batson framework not only by the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, but
by the equal protection guarantees of Art. 24 of our Declaration of
Rights. "163
Once this barrier had been crossed, the court took the logical
and constitutionally necessary next step by holding that gender-based
peremptory challenges are a form of unconstitutional discrimination. I64 The court of appeals simply applied Supreme Court precedent
to a Maryland constitutional provision to reach its holding in Tyler.
The court began its opinion by finding that the Supreme Court had
based its protection from discriminatory peremptory challenges on
whether a juror belonged to a "suspect classification." 165 In addition,
Maryland's Equal Rights Amendment provides that "'classifications
based on gender are suspect and are subject to strict scrutiny.'" 166
The court wed the two concepts with the following reasoning:
The Equal Rights Amendment is pulled into the orbit of
Batson by the equal protection guarantees of Art. 24 of our
Declaration of Rights. Batson held that the equal protection
guarantees forbid the State ... to use peremptory challenges
to exclude potential .furors solely on account of their race
.... The Supreme Court deemed race to be a suspect
classification subject to strict scrutiny. We have held that
because of Art. 46 sex, like race, is a suspect classification
subject to strict scrutiny. Therefore, under Maryland constitutional law, the State may not use peremptory challenges
to exclude potential jurors because of their gender .167
In reviewing the trial transcript, the Tyler court found that the
prosecutor had openly stated that it was the State's desire to seat

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Constitution,' . . . . While it is true ... that the equal protection
guaranties of Article 24 and the Fourteenth. Amendment are independent, capable of divergent effect, it is apparent that the two are
so intertwined that they, in essence, form a double helix, each complementing the other.
Tyler, 330 Md. at 264-65, 623 A.2d at 650 (quoting Attorney General v.
Waldron, 289 Md. 683, 704-05, 426 A.2d 929, 940-41 (1981) (citations omitted».
[d. at 265, 623 A.2d at 650 (quoting Waldron, 289 Md. at 705, 426 A.2d at
941 (1981».
[d. at 265, 623 A.2d at 650.
[d. at 270, 623 A.2d at 653.
[d. at 263, 623 A.2d at 649-50.
[d. at 266, 623 A.2d at 651 (quoting Murphy v. Edmonds, 325 Md. 342, 357
n.7, 601 A.2d 102, 109 n.7 (1992».
[d. at 266, 623 A.2d at 651.
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more men on the jury than women. l68 Due to this blatant admission
of gender bias, the court of appeals ordered a new trial. 169
The court's opinion in Tyler is not, however, as broad a statement as it might first appear. The court was careful to limit its
language to provide only those protections outlined in Batson .170
Indeed, Tyler presented a factual background similar to Batson-the
State's use of peremptory challenges in a criminal trial. According
to the language of Tyler, that is the only scenario where genderbased peremptory challenges are forbidden: "[T]he State [is prohibited] in a criminal prosecution from using peremptory challenges so
as to exclude a person from service as a juror because of that
person's sex. "171
In order to limit the use of gender-based peremptory challenges
to the State in a criminal prosecution, the court appeared to misapply
Batson, and seemingly forgot to apply the remainder of the cases in
. the Batson line. As this Comment has discussed, Batson set out two
themes. The major line of reasoning in Batson concerned the equal
protection rights of the criminal defendant. 172 A minor element of
the Court's decision was the impact that discriminatory peremptory
challenges had on a potential juror. 173 For its decision in Tyler, if
the court of appeals had wished to rely solely on Batson, then the
equal protection right should have protected the criminal defendant
rather than the juror .174
Because the court of appeals had to base its decision in Tyler
on the rights of the juror, it needed to apply the secondary theme
of Batson. Because the rights of the juror were only subsidiary in
Batson, the court of appeals should have relied on Powers, Edmon168. [d. at 267-68, 623 A.2d at 651-52. At trial, the prosecutor and the reviewing

169.
170.

171.
172.
173.
174.

judge relied on the fact that the Supreme Court had not ruled against gender
based peremptory challenges. [d. Therefore, the prosecutor openly submitted
any reason, besides race, to explain the strikes. [d. at 268, 623 A.2d at 652.
[d. at 271, 623 A.2d at 653.
[d. at 266, 623 A.2d at 651.
[d. at 270, 623 A.2d at 653 (emphasis added).
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85-87 (1986).
[d. at 87.
If Maryland continues to limit the application of Batson to peremptory challenges issued by the State, the question of whose rights are being protectedthe juror's or the criminal defendant's-is merely a matter of semantics. It
hardly matters to the criminal defendant whether he is allowed to argue his
rights or, through third-party standing, argue the rights of the juror. Either
way, the ability to object to a strike by the State and to appeal that determi-.
nation is utilized by and benefits the criminal defendant.
Now that the right has been placed with the juror, the court will have a
difficult time following the limitation set out in Tyler. If the right is not that
of the criminal defendant, what reason is there to deny the application of
Edmonson (civil parties' use) and McCollum (criminal defendant's use)?
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son, and McCollum-cases where the Supreme Court set forth the
equal protection right of the juror as primary.17S To have acknowledged these cases in the context of gender, however, would have
been to invite expansion beyond merely the State's use of discriminatory peremptory challenges.
C.

Maryland and the Process of Appellate Review
If one recognizes the informal nature of the Batson challenge in

a proceeding,176 one realizes the essential nature of appellate review.
Early cases established rules regarding the scope of appellate review,
and the court of appeals recognized, as did the Court in Batson,
that an appellate court should "give great deference to the first level
findings of fact made by a trial judge."177 The court of appeals also
held, however, that "'[w]hen a claim is based upon a violation of a
constitutional right it is our obligation to make an independent
constitutional appraisal from the entire record."'178 This appraisal
goes to the "ultimate second level fact, the existence or non-existence
of neutral, nonracial reasons for striking the black venire members."179 In cases such as Stanley v. State, Stanley II, Tolbert v.
State, and Chew v. State, the court of appeals and the court of
special appeals were open to reviewing the record for the prosecutor's
justifications; however, subsequent case law has all but precluded
such review.
The Supreme Court and the Maryland courts soon began limiting
the manner in which peremptory challenge appeals were reviewed. In
Maryland, this review process began rather innocently in Bailey v.
State,180 where the court of special appeals examined a trial court's
determination of whether a prima facie case of discriminatory peremptory challenges had been established. The court of special appeals
examined court of appeals precedent,181 and held that for this first
175. See discussion supra parts lILA., III.B., III.C.
176. See supra text accompanying note 118. An objection to a peremptory challenge
can be made, acted upon, and dismissed within a matter of moments.
177. Chew v. State, 317 Md. 233, 245, 562 A.2d 1270, 1276 (1989). The "first
level" finding is the determination of whether a prima facie case of discriminatory peremptory challenges exists. [d. at 244-45, 562 A.2d at 1275-76.
178. Tolbert v. State, 315 Md. 13, 24, 553 A.2d 228, 232 (1989) (quoting Harris v.
State, 303 Md. 685, 697, 496 A.2d 1074, 1080 (1985».
179. Stanley v. State, 85 Md. App. 92, 100, 582 A.2d 532, 536 (1990), cert. denied,
322 Md. 240, 587 A.2d 247 (1991); see also Chew, 317 Md. at 245, 562 A.2d
at 1276 ("appellate court will ... make an independent constitutional appraisal
concerning the existence of neutral, non-racial reasons for the striking of a
juror").
180. 84 Md. App. 323, 579 A.2d 774, cert. denied, 321 Md. 225, 582 A.2d 531
(1990).
181. [d. at 328-30, 579 A.2d at 776-77; see supra note 175 and accompanying text.
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level inquiry, the trial court's determination should be given great
deference.l s2 To overturn the trial court's determination of whether
a prima facie case had been established, therefore, the appellate court
must find that the trial court's ruling was clearly erroneous. IS3 The
court of special appeals stated as follows:
It is the trial judge who is in close touch with the racial

mood, be it harmonious or be it tense, of the local community, either as a general proposition or with respect to a
given trial of high local interest. The trial judge is positioned
to observe the racial composition of the venire panel as a
whole, a vital fact frequently not committed to the record
and, therefore, unknowable to the reviewing court ....
The standard of review, therefore, is perforce that of whether
the trial judge's fact finding ... is clearly erroneous. l84
The clearly erroneous standard set forth in Bailey was limited
to the first level finding of whether a prima facie case had been
established. However, several later decisions by the court of special
appeals applied the. Supreme Court's decision in Hernandez v. New
York,lss and read Bailey too broadly, thereby severely limiting appellate review. In Hernandez, the Supreme Court focused upon both
the first and second level inquiries made by the trial judge. The
Court stated that the trial judge was in the best position to determine
.
credibility:
In the typical peremptory challenge inquiry, the decisive
question will be whether counsel's race-neutral explanation
for a peremptory challenge should be believed. There will
seldom be much evidence bearing on that issue, and the
best evidence often will be the demeanor of the attorney
who exercises the challenge. As with the state of mind of a
juror, evaluation of the prosecutor's state of mind based

182. Bailey, 84 Md. App. at 328, 579 A.2d at 776. "The determination of whether
that threshold has been crossed is entrusted to the trial judge." Id. The
defendant had requested that the court make an independent review, similar
to what earlier cases had required when examining the second level fact finding.
See supra notes 178-79. On review, the court of special appeals would not
extend independent review to the first level finding. Relying on earlier case
law, the court held that when examining the first level finding, a reviewing
court should "not presume to second-guess the call by the 'umpire on the
field' either by way of de novo fact finding or by way of independent
constitutional judgment." Bailey, 84 Md. App. at 328, 579 A.2d at 776.
183. Bailey, 84 Md. App. at 329, 579 A.2d at 776.
184. Id. at 328-29, 579 A.2d at 776.
185. 500 U.S. 352 (1991).
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on demeanor and credibility lies "peculiarly within a trial
judge's province. "186
Relying upon this rationale, the Supreme Court rejected independent,
de novo review in favor of the more deferential "clearly erroneous"
standard for both levels of inquiry.187 In spite of this ruling, the
Court devoted considerable time to a discussion of the facts surrounding the challenged strikes and found that they were nondiscriminatory.188
Unfortunately, later Maryland cases read Bailey as stating the
same principle as Hernandez. 189 In its opinion in Eiland v. State, the
court of special appeals credits Bailey with anticipating the Hernandez
decision. l90 The court of special appeals relied on Bailey and Hernandez in order to ignore the standard of appellate review set out
in Chew v. State and Tolbert v. State, stating: "There cannot be,
by its very nature, an independent constitutional review at the appellate level .... " 191 Therefore, according to Eiland, when the trial
judge hears the prosecutor's justification for the peremptory challenge
issued, and believes it to be the truth, "[t]hat is really all there is to
it. "192
As discussed in part IV.B., the court of special appeals' opinion
in Eiland was decided before the Batson guarantee was incorporated
186. [d. at 365 (quoting Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 428 (1985».
187. [d. at 368-69. Indeed, the Court had a difficult time even understanding the
claim.
Petitioner advocates "independent" appellate review of a trial court's
rejection of a Batson claim. We have difficulty understanding the
nature of the review petitioner would have us conduct. Petitioner
explains that "[i]ndependent review requires the appellate court to
accept the findings of historical fact and credibility of the lower court
unless they are clearly erroneous. Then, based on these facts, the
appellate court independently determines whether there has been discrimination." But if an appellate court accepts a trial court's finding
that a prosecutor's race-neutral explanation for his peremptory challenges should be believed, we fail to see how the appellate court
nevertheless could find discrimination. The credibility of the prosecutor's explanation goes to the heart of the equal protection analysis,
and once that has been settled, there seems nothing left to review.
[d. at 366-67 (quoting Pet'rs Rep. Br. at 17).
188. [d. at 368-71.
189. See, e.g., Mejia v. State, 90 Md. App. 31, 38-39, 599 A.2d 1207, 1211 (1992)
(holding that when reviewing a second level finding as to whether "an ultimate
case of discrimination has been established," courts should not use de novo
independent review, but should rather apply a clearly erroneous standard).
190. 92 Md. App. 56, 99, 607 A.2d 42, 65 ("[O]ur own analysis in Bailey v. State,
of the appropriate standard of appellate review anticipated Hernandez v. New
York and is in complete harmony with it .... "), rev'd on other grounds sub
nom. Tyler v. State, 330 Md. 261, 623 A.2d 648 (1993).
191. [d. at 97, 607 A.2d at 62.
192. [d. at 94, 607 A.2d at 61.
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into the Maryland Constitution. 193 Prior to such incorporation, decisions were based upon Fourteenth Amendment law as determined
by the Supreme Court. l94 Because Eiland had to be based upon the
application of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is best seen as applying
Supreme Court law via Hernandez, rather than expanding the basis
of Bailey. Viewed as an application of Hernandez, the Eiland court's
reading of Bailey does not have to be applied as precedent in future
cases.
Because Maryland has now incorporated the Batson guarantee
into its constitution, it has the opportunity to return to the prior line
of analysis-independent review of second level findings. Because the
Maryland Constitution can provide greater protection to individuals
than can the United States Constitution, it would be a simple step
for the courts to return to the line of precedent set out in Stanley,
Tolbert, Chew, and Bailey, where the appellate courts took a more
active role in determining whether the party presented a neutral
explanation· for the challenged peremptory strike.
Allowing independent appellate review would afford greater protection to the equal protection rights of jurors. The entire process
of making and ruling on a Batson challenge can be accomplished in
a matter of moments. In other situations, whole trials are devoted
to the determination of whether a discriminatory act has occurred.
Yet a Batson challenge, designed to protect the same constitutional
right to equal protection of the laws, can be conducted with a few
questions. Unfortunately, due to the ever-changing nature of this
right, the judicial system has been unable to adopt a standard method
for trial judges to determine whether a discriminatory act has occurred. This Comment does not advocate the use of a full scale trial
within a trial in order to determine the validity of a Batson challenge.
However, there should be some middle ground between a full trial
and a quick question or two directed at the offending party. Until
a middle ground is reached, independent appellate review of second
level findings is necessary to protect jurors' equal protection rights. 19s
V.

REALITIES: CURRENT AND FUTURE
The Supreme Court's decision in Georgia v. McCo/lum,l96 barring a criminal defendant's use of race-based peremptory challenges,
193. See Tyler v. State, 330 Md. 261, 265, 623 A.2d 648, 650 (1993).
194. See supra notes 137-38 and accompanying text.
195. At the,very least, independent review will allow the appellate courts to develop
procedures necessary to make proper determinations. The appellate courts
should address the following questions: Should the parties take an oath before
being asked to explain their actions? Should cross-examination be allowed? If
testimony is not under oath and subject to cross-examination, how is it
preserved for appellate review?
196. 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992).
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should not have come as a surprise, as it was a logical extension of
the path the Court had been traveling. Once the equal· protection
right attached to the juror, it made little sense to allow the criminal
defendant the ability to discriminate while denying it to every other
player in the field. l97
Because the Court has reached this stage, some realities need to
be examined. This section will discuss the following three questions:
(l) How could the McCollum court classify a criminal defendant as
a state actor? (2) How far the courts are, or should be, extending
protection to certain groups? (3) Does the voir dire system in Maryland actually promote discriminatory peremptory challenges?

A.

The Criminal Defendant as a State Actor

Although it may have been logical to prohibit a criminal defendant from issuing discriminatory peremptory challenges, a major
point in the Court's rationale in McCollum is suspect. In order to
show a Fifth or a Fourteenth Amendment violation, the denial of
equal protection must flow from a state actor.l 98 In McCollum, the
Court determined that the criminal defendant was acting in such a
capacity when choosing a jury}99
It may reasonably be argued that without the criminal defendant,
there would be little need for a prosecutor. The earliest hint of
practiced "law" came about when the ruling government punished
those who disobeyed its edicts. From these early moments, these two
entities have struggled against one another; the state to punish, the
defendant to avoid punishment.2°o
Yet in McCollum, the Court viewed the State and the criminal
defendant as one entity. To counter this position, the defendant cited
Polk County v. Dodson 201 for the argument that the adversarial
relationship between the defendant and the State would negate this
"state actor" classification. 202 In re-examining Polk County, the
Court decided that "the determination whether a public defender is
a state actor for a particular purpose depends on the nature and
197. The denial to a criminal defendant of the right to discriminate against jurors
should have become even more apparent when the Court decided Powers. In
Powers, the criminal defendant's equal protection rights were seen as secondary
to the juror's. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 406-09 (1991). Given the hierarchy
of rights, the Court could hardly continue to allow the secondary concern to
affect the primary.
198. See supra note 66.
199. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2356.
200. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
201. 454 U.S. 312 (1981).
202. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2356.
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context of the function he is performing. "203 The Court saw as
determinative the fact that the defendant is choosing a jury, "a
quintessential governmental body. "204 Other commentators have treated
the jury selection process as akin to a government personnel action.20s
However, to view this selection procedure as a type of personnel
function, simply seating a government body, seems absurd. The
defendant is given use of the peremptory challenge precisely because
of her adversarial relationship with the State.
While peremptory challenges are not constitutionally mandated,206 no one would suggest that it would be proper only for the
government to have such power. Both sides utilize them for opposing
purposes. Neither party is trying to select an impartial panel to
adjudicate his claim. The selection of a jury, in fact, highlights the
opposite positions between the two parties. The State is trying to
punish; the defendant is trying to avoid punishment.
The Supreme Court has determined that a proper reading of
Polk County requires that one examine the nature and context of
the function that the criminal defendant is performing. 207 If the true
nature of the peremptory challenge is emphasized, it will be apparent
that it is the traditional adversarial function envisioned by Polk
County.
1993]

B.

The Peremptory Challenge

Who is Protected?

The primary focus in the area of equal protection rights and
peremptory challenges has been, of course, the issue of race. The
203. [d.; supra note 91.
204. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2356.
205. Barbara Underwood states that "jury selection takes place as part of a
governmental proceeding, in a public courthouse, for public purposes ....
Peremptory challenges are part of the process of constructing a decision-making
body that exercises governmental power." Underwood, supra note 83, at 751.
Chesney and Gallagher view the selection process as "assist[ing] the
government in its obligation to empanel an impartial jury." Chesney & Gallagher, supra note 38, at 1072. Like McCollum, Chesney and Gallagher cite
Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980), for holding that a public defender would
be a state actor when making personnel decisions. [d. These commentators
view selecting a jury as being a similar personnel matter. [d. Chesney and
Gallagher examined the public defender's job functions that the Court listed
as adversarial in Polk County: "'[T]o enter "not guilty" pleas, move to
suppress State's evidence, object to evidence at trial, cross-examine State's
witnesses, and make closing arguments in behalf of defendants.'" [d. at 1074
(quoting Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 320 (1981». Chesney and
Gallagher state, however, that peremptory challenges should not be on this
adversarial list because such challenges are not constitutionally mandated, and
therefore, their use is not part of this adversarial role. [d. at 1074.
206. See supra note 77.
.
207. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2356.
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black juror has been the main actor in almost every Supreme Court
decision regarding the peremptory challenge.lOS Yet supposedly, it is
the juror who has been given 'the equal protection right, and not
merely the black juror. Any juror should be free from government
denial of equal protection of the laws. It seems logical that standard
equal protection analysis should extend beyond race to all suspect
classifications.
As the Supreme Court recognized in Hernandez v. New York,
national origin is a protected suspect classification. 209 Religion also
fits into this category. 210 Gender was treated differently, however,
because the Court has not labeled it as a suspect class covered by
full strict scrutiny protection. 2l1 Prior to the Supreme Court's recent
opinion .prohibiting gender-based peremptory challenges, 212 several
208. See Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992); Edmonson v. Leesville
.
Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991);
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202
(1965). Only Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991), which dealt with
discrimination based on national origin, did not feature a black juror but
instead featured prospective Latino jurors.
209. 500 U.S. 352. See also Government of Virgin Islands v. Forte, 865 F.2d 59,
64 (3d Cir. 1989) (holding that whites are a protected group), appeal after
remand, 904 F.2d 694 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 954 (1991); United
States v. Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302, 1313-14 (10th Cir. 1987) (holding that NativeAmericans are a protected group); United States v. Biaggi, 673 F. Supp. 96,
100-02 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding that Italian-Americans are a protected group),
aff'd, 853 F.2d 89 (2d Cir. 1988), and cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1052 (1989);
Commonwealth v. Gagnon, 449 N.E.2d 686, 690-93 (Mass. App. Ct. 1983)
(holding that persons of French-Canadian origin are a "group with distinct
cultural and linguistic traditions" and as such are protected), aff'd sub nom.
Commonwealth v. Bourgeois, 465 N.E.2d 1180 (Mass. 1984); Miller v. State,
733 S.W.2d 287, 289 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that the Batson rationale
protects Hispanics).
But see Murchu v. United States, 926 F.2d 50, 54-55 (1st Cir.) (holding
that Batson protection applied only to groups which had been subject to
discrimination, which did not include Irish-Americans), cert. denied, 112 S.
Ct. 99 (1991); United States v. Bucci, 839 F.2d 825, 833 (1st Cir.) (same
rationale for Italian-Americans), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 844 (1988).
210. See United States v. Greer, 939 F.2d 1076, 1085-86 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding
that Jews are a protected group), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1390 (1993); People
v. Johnson, 767 P.2d 1047, 1054 (Cal. 1989) (holding that Jews are a protected
group), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1038 (1990); People v. Kagan, 420 N.Y.S.2d
987, 989-90 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979) (pre-Batson decision protecting Jews).
But see United States v. Clemmons, 892 F.2d 1153, 1157 (3d Cir. 1989)
(allowing prosecutor to strike juror as being "probably Hindu"), cert. denied,
496 U.S. 927 (1990); People v. Malone, 570 N.E.2d 584, 589-90 (Ill. App. Ct.
1991) (allowing prosecutor to strike juror with strong religious beliefs); Chambers v. State, 724 S.W.2d 440, 442 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (allowing prosecutor
to strike juror because of membership in "fringe religion").
211. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-99 (1976).
212. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex reI. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994). See infra notes 22432 and accompanying text for a more detailed discussion of this case.
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lower courts had found that such challenges violated the Batson
guarantee. 213
In United States v. De Gross,214 the Ninth Circuit held that
gender discrimination impacted a juror with the same· harms as
outlined in Batson, and was therefore illegal. 215 Of additional aid to
the Ninth Circuit was the Supreme Court's holding that a defendant's
Sixth Amendment rights were violated if women were excluded from
juries. 216 In its analysis, the Ninth Circuit applied the proper "middlelevel" test for gender classifications: Whether such challenges are
substantially related to the achievement of an important governmental
objective. 217 In doing so, the Ninth Circuit found that peremptory
challenges "are a necessary means for achieving the important governmental objective" of seating an impartial jury.218 Gender-based
strikes are similar, however, to race-based strikes because they are
"based either on the false assumption that members of a certain
group are unqualified to serve as jurors, or on the false assumption
that members of certain groups are unable to consider impartially
the case. "219
When the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland was presented
with this gender question in Eiland v. State,220 it chose to follow the

213. See United States v. De Gross, 960 F.2d 1433, 1438 (9th Cir. 1992) (en bane);
State v. Levinson, 795 P.2d 845, 849 (Haw. 1990); Commonwealth v. Hutchinson, 481 N.E.2d 188, 191 (Mass. 1985); Tyler v. State, 330 Md. 261, 266,
623 A.2d 648,651 (1993); State v. Gonzales, 808 P.2d 40, 49 (N.M. Ct. App.),
cert. denied, 806 P.2d 65 (N.M. 1991); People v. Irizarry, 560 N.Y.S.2d 279,
280 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990).
But see United States v. Nichols, 937 F.2d 1257, 1262 (7th Cir. 1991),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 989 (1992); United States v. Hamilton, 850 F.2d 1038,
1042-43 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1069 (1990); Fisher v. State,
587 So. 2d 1027, 1030 (Ala. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 587 So. 2d 1039 (Ala.
1991), and cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1486 (1992); People v. Thomas, 559 N.E.2d
262, 267 (III. App. 1990), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 89 (1991); State v. Adams,
533 So. 2d 1060, 1062-63 (La. App. 1988), cert. denied, 540 So. 2d 338 (La.
1989); State v. Pullen, 811 S.W.2d 463, 467 (Mo. App. 1991), cert. denied,
114 S. Ct. 200 (1993); State v. Culver, 444 N.W.2d 662, 665-66 (Neb. 1989);
State v. Oliviera, 534 A.2d 867, 869-70 (R.l. 1987).
214. 960 F.2d 1433 (9th Cir. 1992).
215. [d. at 1438-39. "[J]ust as racial discrimination in the judicial system is a
stimulant to community prejudice which impedes equal justice for racial minorities, so too is gender discrimination in the judicial system a stimulant to
community prejudice which impedes equal justice for women." [d. at 1438
(citations omitted).
216. [d. (citing Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 536 (1975».
217. [d. at 1439.
218. [d.
219. [d. (citations omitted).
220. 92 Md. App. 56, 88-94, 607 A.2d 42, 57-61 (1992), rev'd sub nom. Tyler v.
State, 330 Md. 261,623 A.2d 648 (1993).
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Fourth Circuit. 221 The Fourth Circuit, in United States v. Hamilton,222
distinguished equal protection law generally from the "unique situation" involved with peremptory challenges and racial discrimination. 223
The Supreme Court, in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rei. T.B.,224
recently put an end to the differing opinions of the circuits and the
states in regard to gender-based strikes. Justice Blackmun began the
Court's analysis by recognizing past discrimination based on gender.225 The opinion then outlines the equal protection rule that holds
that government policies which result in gender-based classifications
are subjected to heightened scrutiny.226 "Thus, the only question is
whether discrimination on the basis of gender in jury selection
substantially furthers the State's legitimate interest in furthering a
fair and impartial trial."227 The State of Alabama advanced the
rationale that male and female jurors react differently to different
issues.228 However, the Court would not "accept as a defense to
gender-based peremptory challenges 'the very stereotype the law
condemns." '229
While barring gender-based strikes, the Court is careful to explain that this new limit does not mean the demise of the peremptory
challenge. 23o Peremptory challenges may be used to strike "any group
or class of individuals normally subject to 'rational basis' review. "231
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.

226.
"
227.
228.
229.

230.
231.

Id. at 89-91, 607 A.2d at 59.
850 F.2d 1038 (4th Cir. 1988).
Id. at 1042.
114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994).
Id. at 1422-24. Justice Scalia, in dissent, took exception to this theme: "Today's
opinion is an inspiring demonstration of how thoroughly up-to-date and rightthinking we Justices are in matters pertaining to the sexes (or as this Court
would have it, the genders), and how sternly we disapprove the male chauvinist
attitudes of our predecessors." [d. at 1436 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
"'[O]ur Nation has had a long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination,'
a history which warrants the heightened scrutiny we afford all gender-based
classifications today." [d. at 1425 (quoting Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.
677, 684 (1973».
Id. at 1425.
Id. at 1426.
Id. (quoting Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410 (1991». The Court cites several
studies that concluded that there was little or no difference in the way men
and women" reacted to issues at trial. Id. at 1426-27 nn.9-1O. Justice Scalia
points out that this stance appears to put the majority at odds with earlier
Sixth Amendment "fair cross-section" cases. Id. at 1436 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
He quotes from Taylor v. Louisiana: "'Controlled studies ... have concluded
that women bring to juries their own perspectives and values that influence
both jury deliberation and result.'" Id. (quoting Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S.
522, 532 (1975».
Id. at 1429.
Id.
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The Court then elaborates as to future uses of the peremptory
challenge: "Even strikes based on characteristics that are disproportionately associated with one gender could be appropriate, absent a
showing of pretext. "232
Protection from discriminatory challenges now extends to midlevel equal protection rationale. The near future should bring substantial litigation fleshing out what other classifications will now
enjoy protection.
C.

Voir Dire in Maryland: Promoting Discrimination

Discriminatory attitudes are fostered through a multitude of
factors. Personal experiences, upbringing, and social structure are
some of the variables that shape an individual's view of "others."
There is a strong thread of commonality running through these
factors that impact discrimination. Information is said to be the key
to informed, objective decision-making. 233 If less information is available to a decision-maker, it is more likely that the end analysis will

232. [d. In a footnote the Court explains that strikes based on military service or
persons employed as nurses may affect one gender more than the other. [d.
at 1429 n.16. If no pretext is involved, however, the Court does not view these
as unconstitutionally gender-based. [d. These examples lead to interesting
speculation. I f the case appeared to turn on a certain issue, would the Court
allow the exclusion of all mothers or all fathers?
233. Judge Richard Posner has written extensively on the subject of the economics
of law. What follows is his most basic explanation for discrimination based
upon lack of information:
Racial discrimination has a number of possible causes. Sheer malevolence and irrationality are factors in many cases .... Race enters as
a convenient factor identifying the members of the competing or
exploited group. Another factor, however, is cost of information. To
the extent that race or some attribute similarly difficult to conceal
(sex, accent, etc.) is positively correlated with the desired characteristics, it is rational for people to use the attribute as a proxy for the
underlying characteristic with which it is correlated ("statistical discrimination"). If experience has taught me (perhaps incorrectly) that
most Mycenaeans have strong garlic breath, I can economize on
information costs by declining to join a club that accepts Mycenaeans
as members. Although I might be forgoing valuable associations with
Mycenaeans who do not have strong garlic breath, this opportunity
cost may be smaller than the information cost that more expensive
sampling of Mycenaeans would entail.
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 26.5 at 661 (1992).
Taken out of the economic field, the same principle can be stated in fairly
simple terms: Through either lack of desire or lack of ability, people tend to
judge the book by its cover. Judge Posner's analysis provides some rational
basis to this old adage.

Baltimore Law Review
[Vol. 23
have been based upon personal biases. 234 A striking example of action
based upon race stereotyping due to lack of information is provided
by the following comment by Reverend Jesse Jackson, made during
a speech in Chicago decrying black-on-black crime:
262

There is nothing more painful to me at this stage in my life
than to walk down the street and hear footsteps and start
thinking about robbery-then look around and see somebody white and feel relieved. 23s
This cost-benefit analysis appears to fit nicely into the current
status of the peremptory challenge in Maryland. Peremptory challenges are issued after the process of voir dire, and are based upon
(1) the information received from the juror in response to voir dire
questioning,236 and (2) the physical composition of the potential
juror. 237 If the information received during voir dire is limited, it is
likely that a party will base its peremptory challenges on other factors

234. The New Republic once asked several individuals for their response to an
article written by Richard Cohen in the Washington Post Magazine. How
Would You Respond? The Jeweler's Dilemma, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 10,
1986, at 18. Cohen had reported that certain jewelry stores in Washington,
D.C. had used a buzzer system to admit customers. [d. Through this system,
store owners could refuse to admit customers if they feared a robbery. [d.
Some store owners were excluding young black males as those individuals who
were most likely to commit a robbery. [d. Cohen defended this discrimination,
stating as follows: "[T]he mere recognition of race as a factor ... is not in
itself racism." Id.
Walter Williams, a Professor of Economics at George Mason University,
responded as follows:
Men are not gods. Therefore, men face challenges gods would not
have to endure-ignorance and uncertainty. To make decisions, we
need to have information about the world around us. The information
we gather is not only imperfect, it is costly as well. So we learn to
economize by guessing, prejudging, and using stereotypes .... Can
we say such a person is a sexist/racist? An alternative answer is that
he is behaving like an intelligent Bayesian (Sir Thomas Bayes, the
father of statistics). Inexpensively obtained information about race
and sex is a proxy for information that costs more to obtain ....
[d.

235. The Rev. Jesse Jackson, Speech in Chicago, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 13, 1993, at 17.
236. This information consists not only of the actual answers given during voir
dire, but also the form of the answer and the mannerisms reflected in giving
the answer.
237. Voir dire in Maryland is governed by the Maryland Rules. Rule 4-312(c) states
that each side is provided with a jury list "that includes the name, age, sex,
education, occupation, and occupation of spouse" of each potential juror.
MD. RULES 4-312(c) (1994). MD. RULES 4-312(d) states that the examination of
jurors may be conducted by the parties or by the court in its discretion. [d.
4-312(d).
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that may be discriminatory. 238 Maryland, it seems, not only subscribes
to the view that voir dire should be limited, but does so with the
specific intent of limiting information for peremptory challenges.
In its 1992 decision of Davis v. State,239 the Court of Special
Appeals of Maryland provided an in-depth review of the history of
voir dire in Maryland. The court found two opposing views of voir
dire currently in use.240 According to the court, Maryland had chosen
238. See supra notes 233-35 and accompanying text.
239. 93 Md. App. 89, 611 A.2d 1008 (1992), af!'d, 333 Md. 27, 633 A.2d 867
(1993). The main issue on appeal concerned the defendant's argument that the
trial judge should have allowed him to ask an additional question of the jury
panel as to whether any of the prospective jurors "had ever been a member
of the law enforcement community or had a close relative or friend who was
or has been a member of the law enforcement community." [d. at 92, 611
A.2d at 1009. The trial judge had previously asked only six questions to the
panel. [d. Judge Moylan, writing for the majority, provided an extensive
historical review in the hope of "reaffirm[ing]-categorically and for reporting-the well-settled limits that have long circumscribed and shall continue to
circumscribe the voir dire examination of prospective jurors in Maryland .... "
[d. at 91, 611 A.2d at 1009. Judge Moylan believed such finality was necessary
to put an end to what he termed the "voguish 'Contention of the Year' for
the September, 1991 Term"-"that defendants are entitled to a broader scope
of inquiry during the jury selection process than is typically allowed." [d.
240. [d. at 93, 611 A.2d at 1010. The first view is an "expansive" one. [d. Under
this view, questioning is addressed individually to jurors rather than en masse.
[d. The questioning is usually done by the parties themselves, and the questions
can reach beyond what is necessary to establish a challenge for cause. [d.
Judge Moylan believes questioning works something like this:
The better to pursue those aims, young advocates (and old) pay
handsome tuitions at exotic resorts to sit at the feet of storied masters
of trial advocacy. They hear wondrous accounts of how virtually
unfettered voir dire may in the hands of an astute psychologist be
employed 1) to psychoanalyze the prospective juror so that the advocate can predict with almost mathematical certainty how the juror
will react to a given fact pattern in the case that is about to unfold;
2) to "strike a deal" (a favorite cliche at such seminars) with a juror,
so that if certain evidentiary developments come to pass, the juror is
almost honor-bound to respond in the "agreed" fashion; and 3) to
hypnotize or to condition the juror in advance of the trial proper as
to the advocate's theory of the case. The fledglings hear endless tall
tales of famous cases won or lost on voir dire. At the very least,
these are rollicking good war stories told by entertaining spinners of
yarns and everyone comes away with a sense of the tuition having
been well-spent.
To this school of thought, mentor and pupil alike, expansive voir
dire is the ultimate palladium of liberty, fair play, and justice. It is
the jewel in the crown of trial by jury.
[d. at 94, 611 A.2d at 1010.
The second view is an "austere" one. [d. at 94-95, 611 A.2d at 1010.
Under this view, questioning is done en masse by the trial judge, and is limited
to those questions that would establish a challenge for cause. [d. at 95, 611
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the "Spartan" view as early as 1905, and has yet to deviate from
its rationale. 241 At the heart of this view is that a defendant is entitled
to an "impartial jury and no more. "242 Therefore, voir dire should
not be used to provide a party with "every last 'tilt' or 'edge' of
favorable predisposition.' '243 Because the peremptory challenge is not
constitutionally guaranteed, the court found no authority that mandated expansive voir dire. 244
The court of special appeals determined that the main themes
of the "austere" school of thought were well-settled law in Maryland.
First, the nature and extent of voir dire is "entrusted to the wide
discretion of the trial judge. "245 From that discretion, the trial judge
decides who is to conduct voir dire. 246 Also, it is within the judge's
discretion whether to question the jurors en masse or individually. 247
Finally, the court turned to the permitted focus of the voir dire
examination, outlining two goals of voir dire. 248 The first goal was
the constitutional guarantee of an impartial jury.249 The court again
stressed that this goal only guaranteed an impartial jury and not an
"ideal" or "perfect" jury from a litigant's point of view. 250 In order
to achieve this first goal, the challenge for cause is available to
remove those jurors who cannot render an impartial verdict. 2SJ
The second goal of voir dire, in those states that allow it, is to
help a party better utilize peremptory challenges. 2S2 Because Maryland
follows the more "austere" school of thought, the court rejected
this second goal. 2S3 The court held that "voir dire examination in

241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.

A.2d at 1010. Judge Moylan writes that this group views the first school of
thought as "errant, if not grotesque, foolishness." [d. at 94, 611 A.2d at 1010.
[d. at 96, 611 A.2d at 1011 (discussing Handy v. State, 101 Md. 39, 60 A.
452 (1905».
[d. at 95, 611 A.2d at lOll.
[d.
"When a constitution places no value on the voir dire guessing game itself, it
is perforce indifferent on the sub-issue of informed guessing vers,us wild
guessing." [d. at 95-96, 611 A.2d at lOll.
[d. at 103, 611 A.2d at 1014.
[d. at 105, 611 A.2d at 1015-16. The court noted that there has yet to be a
case where the trial judge's decision has been viewed as a clear abuse of
discretion. [d. at 106, 611 A.2d at 1016.
[d. at 106-08, 611 A.2d at 1016-17.
[d. at 108, 611 A.2d at 1017.
[d.
[d.
[d. at 108-09, 611 A.2d at 1017.
[d. at 109, 611 A.2d at 1017.
[d. at 109, 611 A.2d at 1017-18. The court found solid precedent for the
rejection of this goal.
The constitutional right to an impartial jury is basically protected by
questioning on voir dire examination aimed at exposing the existence
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Maryland is designed to be employed exclusively in the service of
the challenge for cause and not in the additional and gratuitous
service of the peremptory challenge."2s4
Strictly limiting voir dire to aiding challenges for cause may
indeed have a long history, but considering the' changing nature of
the peremptory challenge it may be time to adjust its application. 2ss
However, the court of special appeals in Davis reasoned just the
opposite:
[T]he appellant's invitation comes at a particularly unpropitious time in the life of the peremptory challenge. With
more and more varieties of challenge for less than good
cause coming under the cold glare of the Equal Protection
Clause, the institution of the peremptory challenge is, for
the moment at least, in inglorious retreat. Many doomsayers
are predicting its drastic curtailment, if not its total abolition. It is hardly the occasion to expand its implementation.2s6
By refusing to expand the scope of voir dire, the courts are
continuing to close down the amount of information available to
parties. With limited inquiry into a juror's background and beliefs,
a party may be more likely to issue a peremptory challenge on the
basis of some "group" standard. 2S7 The current voir dire standard

254.
255.

256.
257.

of cause for disqualification and the law of this State accordingly so
limits the scope of the information which may be obtained as a matter
of right; it does not encompass asking questions designed to elicit
information in aid of deciding on peremptory challenges.
[d. (quoting Couser v. State, 282 Md. 125, 138-39, 383 A.2d 389, 397 (1978».
[d. at 110, 611 A.2d at 1018.
In J.E.B. v. Alabama ex reI. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994), the Court recognized
the need for informative voir dire:
If conducted properly, voir dire can inform litigants about potential
jurors, making reliance upon stereotypical and pejorative notions
about a particular gender or race both unnecessary and unwise. Voir
dire provides a means of discovering actual or implied bias upon
which the parties may exercise their peremptory challenges intelligently.
See, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 602 (1976)
(Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) (Voir dire "facilitate[s)
intelligent exercise of peremptory challenges and [helps) uncover factors that would dictate disqualification for cause"); United States v.
Whitt, 718 F.2d 1494, 1497 (lOth Cir. 1983) ("Without an adequate
foundation [laid by voir dire), counsel cannot exercise sensitive and
intelligent peremptory challenges").
[d. at 1429 (alteration in original).
Davis, 93 Md. App. at 123, 611 A.2d at 1024-25.
Indeed, it may be rational for a party to act in such away. If statistics show
that on average a certain group will behave in a certain way or hold certain
beliefs, it is rational to make a choice based on that group average, if that is
all of the information that is available. See supra notes 217-19 and accompanying text.
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in Maryland forces a party to make choices based on limited information. The court in Davis saw this as a choice between "informed
guessing versus wild guessing. "2S8 However, when "wild guessing" is
properly equated with discriminatory practices, the need for a more
informed choice is apparent.
VI.

CONCLUSION

What has been outlined in the preceding pages is an effect that
often occurs when the Supreme Court establishes a constitutionally
guaranteed right. The rule is laid down by the Court, and it then
takes decades to work out the kinks. The case of the peremptory
challenge is no different. In effect, the Court has presented the
potential juror with a fundamental right to equal protection of the
laws, and yet has offered no adequate remedy to enforce that right.
The Court has limited what little protection existed by restricting
appellate review.
The peremptory challenge is an old trial tactic and very few, if
any, litigators would be happy to see it obliterated. Both sides in a
dispute desire the power to exclude certain people from the jury.
While all of these strikes are based on some measure of discrimination, probably few are based on grounds that society believes should
be protected. By allowing the peremptory challenge, however, the
courts are permitting a system to operate that can invidiously discriminate with little or no detection. Either side in a dispute can
harbor discriminatory motives, yet mask them in simple terms so
that these routines pass constitutional muster. There are also situations, as in Maryland, where the jury selection process may even
promote the usage of discriminatory peremptory challenges.
Procedurally, the courts are coming closer to the point when
peremptory challenges will be impossible to use. As more groups
come under the Batson protection, fewer non-discriminatory excuses
are left to parties who wish to issue a strike. Everyone is subject to
categorization by gender and race, and almost every rationalization
for a strike can be traced back to one of these two categories. 2s9 As

258. Davis, 93 Md. App. at 95-96, 611 A.2d at 1011.
259. A strike based on a juror's occupation has been held valid. See Chew v. State,
317 Md. 233, 245, 562 A.2d 1270, 1276 (1989); Simpkins v. State, 79 Md.
App. 687, 695, 558 A.2d 816, 820 (1989). Many occupations are connected,
however, to the sex or race of a person. While this link between occupations
and sex or race may be changing, it does protect the rights of the juror. Can
a strike based on someone's "looks" be valid? "Looks" are determined largely
by gender and race. It is difficult, though not impossible, to disassociate one's
self from one's race or sex.
Today, an entire industry exists whose purpose is to aid attorneys in the
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the protections expand, the benefits of the peremptory challenge will
soon be outweighed by its constitutional and administrative costs.
The future of the peremptory challenge is dim, and if one accepts
the basis of the guarantee, that the equal protection right belongs to
the juror, then its demise is long overdue. Justice Thomas, concurring
in McCollum, summed it up well when he wrote:
In my view, by restricting a criminal defendant's use of
such challenges, this case takes us further from the reasoning
and the result of Strauder .... I doubt that this departure
will produce favorable consequences. On the contrary, I am
certain that black criminal defendants will rue the day that
this court ventured down this road that will. eventually lead
to the elimination of peremptory strikes. 260

Jeffrey

s.

Jubera

selection of juries. Rarely are recommendations based on an individual's unique
characteristics and experiences. Rather, socioeconomic probability factors are
used to determine how a particular juror "type" will act. See Drew Camp &
Judith Camp, Psychological Research and Jury Analysis, ARK. LAW., Jan.
1991, at 9, 9; Mark Hansen, Finding Sympathetic Jurors: William Kennedy
Smith Defense Lawyer Reveals his Tactics, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1992, at 29, 29;
Howard Varinsky, What Makes Jurors Tick?: The Expanding Role of Jury
Consultants, ARIZ. ATT'y, Apr. 1992, at 16, 16.
260. Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2359-60 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring)(citation omitted). It must be recognized, however, that the peremptory challenge still exists. As this Comment forecasts the peremptory challenge's ultimate
demise, other commentators have also issued faulty predictions. In his 1984
decision that predicted the entire Batson case line, including McCollum, Judge
Richard Posner also saw the peremptory challenge's ultimate demise. See supra
note 84.
If such [Batson) objections are allowed, it is hard to see how the
peremptory challenge, which has been called "a necessary part of the
trial by jury," will survive. Whenever counsel alleged that his opponent
had a racial or similar type of motivation in exercising a peremptory
challenge (whether he used that challenge to exclude a white or black
- and it would have to be one or the other - or, extending the
principle as one could hardly resist doing, a man or a woman, a Jew
or a gentile, etc.) the opponent would have to come forward with a
reason for wanting to exclude the juror. In other words he would
have to provide good cause, or something very close to it; and the
peremptory challenge would collapse into the challenge for cause ..
United States v. Clark, 737 F.2d 679, 682 (7th Cir. 1984) (citation omitted).

